ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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EASTERN

F.O.
371

~~1947~~

PALESTINE

File No. 951

pp. 10213 - 10376

CLOSED
UNTIL
1978

61886

358 LAST 363

1947

E

10213 | 2

1 NOV

PALESTINE

Registry Number E10213/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3155

Received in Registry 31 Oct 1 Nov

Palestine, Sub Committee One.

Refers New York tel 3150 (E10214/951/31) transmits text of reply by Mr Martin to Mr Herschel Johnson's statement

Last Paper.

10206

References.

(*Print.*)

61886

(*How disposed of.*)

8, Mathieson C.O.
M.I.3a
M.O.4
Admiralty
A.M.
Nov 4
(on E10230)

(*Minutes.*)

Please see also E 10214

J G Cable (J. G. CABLE) 1/11

See E10231

JB Nov. 3

(Action completed.) PEM 5/11

(Index.) 31/8/48

Next Paper.

10214

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

10213

E 3

En Clair WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

NOV

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3155. D. 2.46 a.m. 1st November, 1947.

31st October, 1947. R. 9.30 a.m. 1st November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington (Saving).

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

At this afternoon's meeting of Palestine Sub-Committee 1, Martin commented on following lines on the statement by Herschel Johnson contained in my telegram No. 3150.

I should like Mr. Chairman to make some remarks on the statement of exceptional interest and importance which was made this morning by the delegate of the United States. My delegation listened with great appreciation to what Mr. Herschel Johnson said in regard to the goodwill of the Mandatory Power and this Sub-Committee may be assured that we shall contribute all we can in that direction. It would, however, be unfitting for the United Kingdom to offer any comments on the United States proposal at this stage. The position of the Mandatory Power has already been made clear in more than one statement and there has been no change in their attitude. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will give the most serious consideration to any proposition that is ultimately put forward to the United Nations, and you may be assured that they will consider such proposal in a co-operative spirit and as a good member of the United Nations. But the position at the moment is that the United Kingdom has submitted this problem to the United Nations for their verdict. One proposal is now under consideration in this sub-committee; but there is more than one sub-committee at work and another proposal is under examination elsewhere. When these sub-committees have reported, their recommendations will be debated in the full ad hoc committee which has to make its recommendations to the General Assembly. The function of the United Kingdom observers on these sub-committees is simply to provide factual information and I submit that the United Kingdom should not be asked to comment on this proposal or that, at this stage, nor until the General Assembly has considered the outcome of the deliberations of the ad hoc committee as a whole and has made recommendations. Until that time it is the duty of the Mandatory Power to wait. When the recommendations are known the Mandatory Power must consider what help she can give. In any case my Government must wait until they know what the plan is as a whole. It may appear that the United States' proposal avoids the necessity of a transition period; but there would of course be a transition period from the time of adoption of the scheme until the date, which it is suggested might be 1st July 1948, upon which British forces and responsibility would be withdrawn.

The proposal would clearly impose upon the Mandatory Government heavy responsibility during that period and we should be carrying that responsibility at a particularly difficult time, at a time of the birth of twins, twins, like Pallas Athenae, fully armed. The United States delegate referred this morning to the presence of British troops and the British administration in Palestine during this period as being worth untold gold. We pricked up our ears at that since gold is a commodity of which we have not at present got very much. Obviously the weight of responsibility during this transition period will depend on its character, and its character must depend on factors such as the immigration policy to be applied during the period and the extent to which Arabs and Jews will co-operate in the ultimate plan. It is essential therefore that the United Kingdom should see the complete plan before commenting upon any proposal. To sum up: when we have a complete plan and know that that plan will have the authority of the United Nations, the United Kingdom Government will consider how far it can co-operate in carrying it out. We will then do whatever is reasonable as a good member of the United Nations. I do not think you should ask for more than that assurance.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to High Commissioner Jerusalem as my telegram No. 137.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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1947

E

PALESTINE

E 10214
1 NOV

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Registry Number } E10214/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3150

Received in Registry } 31 Oct
1 Nov

Palestine Sub Committee One.

Transmits statement by U.S. Representative Mr Herschel Johnson in Sub Committee One Meeting Oct 31.

Last Paper.

10213

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8 Mathieson CO.
1 M.I.3a
MO4
Admty
OWI.
Nov 4
(on E 10230)

(Action completed.) 5/11

(Index.) 31/8/48

Next Paper.

10216

(*Minutes.*)

Now please see E 10213
1/11

See E 10231
JB Nov. 3

Inf. P. London Press Service 3/11
6/11

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

6

E

En clair. **WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.**

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3150. D. 11.43 p.m. 31st October, 1947.
R. 7.00 a.m. 1st November, 1947.

31st October, 1947.

Repeated High Commissioner Jerusalem Immediate
Washington - Saving.

10214

1 NOV

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

Proceedings in Palestine Sub-Committee One opened this morning with following statement by United States representative.

[Begins]

I should like at this time to make a brief statement regarding implementation and transitional period. It is clear from report of Special Committee on Palestine and from statements of various representatives in ad hoc Committee that there is general agreement with respect to early termination of mandate. It is also clear from statements made by United Kingdom Delegation that its Government regards early termination of mandate and withdrawal of its forces and administration as desirable. U.N.S.C.O.P. report recommends a two year transitional period starting September 1947. There have been suggestions however that it might be possible to shorten time between recommendation of General Assembly and independence of the two states. United States Delegation feels that early independence is not only feasible but desirable. Furthermore we believe that date for independence can be so fixed that mandatory power may upon withdrawing turn over all governmental responsibility including responsibility for maintenance of law and order to authorities of Arab and Jewish States. This would obviate necessity for a separate transitional period under a trusteeship or other arrangement and for establishment of a special United Nations force for maintenance of law and order.

If this idea of simultaneous termination of mandate and independence of two states is adopted by Sub-Committee certain changes in U.N.S.C.O.P. report such a deletion of all reference to a "transitional period" will have to be made. I would suggest, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that Sub-Committee discuss and come to a conclusion on this suggestion and that if it is favourably considered we immediately begin work on necessary detailed changes in plan contained in U.N.S.C.O.P. report. My Delegation is prepared to present specific proposals for your consideration.

1 NOV

My Delegation does not presume to set a definitive date for attainment of independence in Palestine but would suggest that July 1st, 1948 may be a suitable date for working purposes. In view of my Delegation, steps leading to

/independence

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independence should take place with advice and assistance of General Assembly for this purpose. We believe that General Assembly should establish a United Nations Commission headed by a High Commissioner to advise and assist in transfer of powers of Government from mandatory power to the two independent states and to proposed trust territory of city of Jerusalem and in establishment of new units of Government on a stable basis. [Ends]

Foreign Office pass immediate High Commissioner Jerusalem as my telegram No.155.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to High Commissioner Jerusalem]

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8

Mr Cable - Eastern Dept -

You may like to see the line which is being taken by the L.P.S. on the U.S. proposal on Palestine.

R A Henderson
4/11

1 5
E
9

Central Office of Information

OVERSEAS PRESS SERVICES

SERVICE	DATE	TRANSMISSION
LONDON PRESS	THIRD NOVEMBER	FIVE

E 10214/951/31

INDEXED

DIPLOMATIC PROGRAMME para

ITEM ONE stop LPS Diplomatic Correspondent understands that HM Govt are not expected to make any public comment at this stage on USA Govts proposal that partition of Palestine should enter into effect on first July next and that during transition period up to first July Great Britain should remain responsible for maintenance of law order and administration in Palestine para

At present moment USA Proposal is no more than embryonic stop It was submitted thirtyfirst October to Subcommittee number one of United Nations Palestine Committee stop Subcommittee One has still to debate and reach decision upon it stop Next if it is approved by SubCommittee One it will have to be discussed and voted upon by Palestine Committee stop Finally if it is adopted by Palestine Committee it will come before United Nations Assembly where it would require twothirds vote to secure adoption para

What can be said here and now is that there has been no change in HM Govts policy as explained by Secretary State for Colonies Mr Creech Jones before Palestine Committee sixteenth October comma supplementing his earlier statement of twentysixth September para

That policy which is result of firm Cabinet decision is to withdraw both British troops and British administration from Palestine as soon as can physically be effected unless there is Arab and Jewish agreement on a solution propounded by United Nations para

If there is no such agreement between both communities HM Govt will not accept responsibility for enforcement of a solution either alone or in the major role stop Moveover before consenting to assume even minor role in enforcement HM Govt would have to take into account inherent justice of solution to be enforced and extent to which force would be required para

What USA Govts proposal amounts to is suggestion that British Govt should accept sole responsibility for enforcing partition which is vehemently rejected by Arabs stop It would almost inevitably involve British Govt in task of repressing disturbances dash very task which it is British Govts deliberate aim to avoid comma having already expended hundreds of lives and huge sums of money in endeavour to find fair solution of

P.T.O.

Palestine problem para

Unless which is unfortunately unlikely Arabs and Jews agree upon a given solution comma time limit for British withdrawal will be fixed by British Govt with single consideration that it must be as speedy as physical circumstances permit stop It would clearly not be acceptable for HM Govt to have time limit fixed by others and on other grounds para

Time limit for British withdrawal could hardly be fixed by HM Govt before United Nations final decision is known stop This disposes of press report from Jerusalem that next June has been decided upon as date for completion of withdrawal para

If later on Palestine Committee adopted USA proposal and if it were possible at that time to assume acceptance of proposal by two thirds of Assembly comma it should then comma LPS Diplomatic Correspondent believes comma be practicable for HM Govt to enter into discussion of question of handing over authority in Palestine to a transitional administration stop But it would clearly be incompatible with HM Govts decided policy for date of British withdrawal to be delayed beyond earliest date on which it could otherwise be completed para

Mr Creech Jones is on his way back to London from NewYork stop He is coming primarily to preside over meeting of Governors of British African colonies which opens in London on Thursday stop Opportunity will however doubtless be taken by Cabinet to discuss latest USA proposal with him stop He will be returning to New York later para

ITEM TWO stop It is officially announced that M Mikolaczjyk whose disappearance from Poland was reported ten days ago arrived at Manston aerodrome Kent at twelve thirty today in special RAF plane from British zone Germany stop At his personal request no information is being given about M Mikolajczyks future movements para

END DIPLOMATIC PROGRAMME LPS

RECEIVED IN C.B.
5 NOV 1947
SENT T. DEPT.

See P. 2. 11

Central Office of Information

OVERSEAS PRESS SERVICES

SERVICE	DATE	TRANSMISSION
LONDON PRESS	THIRD NOVEMBER	ONE

LEADER AND HEADLINE SUMMARIES para

Results of Britains municipal elections dash since these admittedly been conducted onparty lines dash are widely reviewed in national press and are in some quarters regarded as political pointer stop Palestine issues are also discussed para

Writing of municipal elections TIMES notices firstly Labour Party has suffered quote notable reverse unquote secondly quote percentage voting may not fall very far short of seventyfive pc or so which went to poll in General election nineteen fortyfive unquote stop TIMES further explains quote Theres been long tradition by which English municipal elections not been conducted on strict party lines of national politics but have given weight chiefly to local problems and to local prominence of candidates stop Of recent years however theres been movement comma led by Labour Party, but now accepted by most Conservatives Liberals comma to introduce national party labels and to regard local and national politics as different aspects of same thing stop Older tradition still lingers in some places and makes interpretation of results and determination of exact significance to be put on such terms as subquote Independent unsubquote subquote Progressive unsubquote and the like not always easy stop It has happened in this election for instance that candidates who were previously subquote Independent unsubquote have appeared as subquote Conservative unsubquote without undergoing any change of view or of policy semicolon but in other cases label subquote Independent unsubquote has stood and stands for real detachments from party ties stop On whole however elections were fought more nearly upon party lines than on any previous occasion unquote stop

YORKSHIRE POST says quote let there be no doubt about it stop Results of Municipal elections do not only reflect voters verdict on local authorities administration stop Election campaigns been fought on party lines stop Vast majority of those who went to polls cast their votes in light of general situation stop When they marked their ballot papers twas not name against which they put their cross that mattered most stop What mattered was fact they voted under overhanging

p.t.o.

gloom of crisis and recorded their lack of confidence in men whose nerveless hands have failed to hold steady the helm para

Churchills comment yesterday was right stop He declared that result of election vindicated conservative doctrine of trusting the people stop That doctrine is very foundation of our democracy colon Franchise is dangerous possession unless people have the sound political instinct which tell them what situation demands stop And tis clear that in popular view situation does not demand socialist prescription stop It been tried and has failed unquote para

DAILY HERALD on other hand under heading quote lessons for labour unquote says quote It will of course be recognised that present setback has several important lessons for Govt and Labour Movement generally stop There clearly been degree of failure in what are nowadays called Govts public relations stop Ministers will need reconsider steps they take to explain their measures to people stop Locally too municipal losses must be regarded as spur to more efficient enthusiastic organisation of Labour parties stop In politics tis never possible rest on ones laurels stop There must be ceaseless initiative ceaseless hard work unquote para

TIMES on Palestine says quote successive American contributions to discussion of Palestine issue comma useful as they are comma cannot materially aid Assembly reach satisfactory conclusion until problem of contriving some United Nations authority to execute any decision at which United Nations may arrive is faced stop American delegates on partition subcommittee do not seem have appreciated weight of public sentiment in this country which supports Govt in their refusal undertake any further responsibility for Palestine except under limitations already clearly laid down in statements of Creech Jones semicolon there seems be lingering hope Britain can after all be persuaded remain in operative control in Palestine without regard to these limitations comma as agent of United Nations unquote stop TIMES says quote While suggestion of definite date for political independence of Palestine is useful comma as likely to exercise sobering influence upon both Jews Arabs comma remaining elements in new American plan present grave difficulties stop Apart altogether from firm refusal of this country comma twice emphasised by Creech Jones comma to undertake sole responsibility for executing policy which requires physical enforcement dash as partition undoubtedly will dash complicated process

p.t.o.

of calling into existence two separate States must plainly be beyond capacity of a Power which is simultaneously engaged in withdrawing its civil and military administration stop Its not as if Jews Arabs were agreed on broad limits of their respective territories or were both prepared accept such constitutional devices as plebiscite to settle their differences semicolon their mutual claims are wholly incompatible stop In such circumstances division of power between Jews Arabs comma and organisation on either side of security forces comma as suggested by Herschel Johnson comma must in absence of effective impartial authority lead straight to civil war stop Such authority can no longer be looked for from Britain since she has herself placed entire problem of future Palestine in hands United Nations stop It can emanate only from United Nations itself stop Theres one situation in which a new authority might not be required stop If United Nations were succeed in evolving scheme which both Jews Arabs would accept comma Britain if invited to do so would assume task of giving effect to it stop This outcome is unfortunately improbable although theres always possibility that prospect of complete British withdrawal by a fixed and early date might enforce upon Jews Arabs alike necessity for accommodation of kind both sides now refuse stop In all other circumstances transitional authority will be necessary comma both to inherit power from mandatory regime and to allocate this power to those who will exercise it in future unquote stop TIMES adds quote Creech Jones is now on way home on other business and Cabinet will take advantage of his return to London to discuss proposals for Palestine but it seems improbable this country can define its policy very much more precisely than it has already done until both award of United Nations and proposals for making that award effective are finally agreed unquote para

NEWS CHRONICLE discussing proposals placed in Trumans hands this weekend by American Council of Economic Advisers says quote Theres much in proposals which will come with jolt to certain sections of American opinion but that does not detract from fact that extremely generous levelheaded approach is being made by American experts to all problems Marshall raised when he spoke at Harvard stop Europe could ask for nothing better or more encouraging than that stop President and his advisers in their turn will be encouraged in their efforts to help Europe by cheering evidence in todays news that Europe is helping herself stop From today Customs Union so long discussed between Benelux bracket Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg unbracket comes into effect unquote para

p. t. o.

14

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN discusses report read by Zhdanov to Conference of Communist Parties in Poland end September stop It says quote written with great clarity and intellectual power tis same time supreme example of that capacity for distortion which makes Russian pronouncements so baffling stop One gets impression Zhdanov is able man who has fallen victim to dogmas he learnt in youth and which he has never for moment questioned stop To any non marxist these dogmas are either completely false or so questionable as to be meaningless but they are repeated with all conviction of one who has communed with God upon mountain or has consulted with oracle at Delphi stop Capitalism and Socialism he proclaims are locked in struggle which can have but one end colon all Capitalist states must be hostile to all Socialist states colon Capitalism is driven by its own inconsistencies to Imperialism and war colon war is caused by subquote unequal development of Capitalism in different countries unsubquote stop All contemporary events are interpreted in light of these dogmas and Russian policy is based on this interpretation stop This is the law and the prophets stop Nothing indeed is more disturbing than sense of inspired authority comma confidence that from now on this report will be accepted by all Communists both inside Russia and outside unquote para

END LEADER SUMMARY para

Main headlines are given results Britains municipal elections this weekend in which Socialists have lost twentythree boroughs comma figures bracket with only two of threeninetwo boroughs to be declared unbracket being dash under headings gains losses dash Conservatives sixthreesix eighteen independents onesevennought onethreefive Socialists fortythree sixeightseven Liberals fortysix fortysix Communists nil nine stop Tis noted elections were fought on Party lines stop Statements by Party HQ may be summarised as colon Churchill dash quote warm thanks and congratulations unquote Liberals quote results on whole very satisfactory unquote and Labour quote results disappointing unquote but quote no political landslide unquote stop Some political corrpts consider question whether Govt still have confidence of electorate may be raised in Commons stop Delhi corrpts quote Nehru as explaining reasons for Indias intervention in Kashmir and as promising Kashmiris would decide own fate stop Karachi corrpts note Jinnahs order providing for formation Pakistan National Guard on voluntary basis stop Newspapers record official entry of quote Benelux unquote dash customs union between Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg dash into European economic field stop Benelux tis stated will represent third largest trading unit in world stop

p.t.o.

Resignation Lord Ashfield from twelve thousand five hundred pounds year post as chairman London Passenger Transport Board is announced stop Tis reported Ashfield is accepting Transport Ministers invitation to join British Transport Commission dash new state authority stop Americans have won all Ryder Cup bracket Golf unbracket foursome para

END LEADER AND HEADLINE SUMMARIES LPS

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 10216 16

3 NOV

Registry Number	E 10216/951/31
FROM	Mr George Thomas
No.	P.Q.
Dated	29 Oct
Received in Registry	3 Nov.

H.M.G. Palestine Policy

Mr George Thomas. Asked S of S if it was with his approval that an official announcement was issued from F.O. to effect that Britain would not concern herself with handing over authority to any racial group in Palestine and that a period of anarchy might follow, and what is H.M.G.'s withdrawal policy.

Mr Bevin. Reference is probably to an agency message which attributed these opinions to "usually well-informed quarters." No statement has been issued from F.O. Referred to S of S Colonies two speeches.

(Minutes.)

3/11

Last Paper.

10214

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
4/11	3/8/48

Next Paper.

10217

32003 F.O.P

EASTERN

E 17

Parliamentary Question

✱ 97. Mr. George Thomas,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, if it was with his approval that an official announcement was issued from the Foreign Office on Friday September 26th to the effect that Britain would not concern herself with handing over authority to any racial group in Palestine and that a period of anarchy might follow; and what is the policy of H.M. Government in carrying out its evacuation of Palestine. ✱

Lab

Cardiff Central

29 OCT 1947

ANSWERED 29 OCT 1947
REPLY ATTACHED.

E 10216
3 NOV

This question is obviously based on the following extract from a Reuter message published on the 26th September:
"In view of usually well-informed quarters the sequence is now likely to be that:-

1. Britain would start preparation to leave Palestine as soon as the present Assembly discussion is complete:
2. the consequent withdrawal would take place as soon as technically and physically possible, and
3. Britain would not concern herself with handing over authority to any racial group in Palestine and that a period of anarchy might follow".

No such statement was issued from the Foreign Office nor indeed has any official statement or communiqué on the subject of Palestine been issued within the last few weeks.

I submit a draft reply, in which the C.O. concur.

J.E. Cable
(J.E. CABLE)

25th October, 1947.

News Dept. first
I.R.
27/10.

J.G.S. Beith
Oct. 27

P. Garran
27/x

B.A.B. Burrows
27 x

27/x

856.

25 OCT 1947

18

RECEIVED IN O.B.
31 OCT 1947
SENT TO DEPT.
3 - NOV 1947

PALESTINE

Government Policy

24. **Mr. George Thomas** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if it was with his approval that an official announcement was issued from the Foreign Office on Friday, 26th September, to the effect that Britain would not concern herself with handing over authority to any racial group in Palestine and that a period of anarchy might follow; and what is the policy of His Majesty's Government in carrying out its evacuation of Palestine.

Mr. Bevin: My hon. Friend's Question no doubt refers to an agency message published on 26th September which attributed these opinions to "usually well-informed quarters." No statement or communiqué on this subject has been issued by the Foreign Office. The policy of His Majesty's Government as regards British withdrawal from Palestine is set out in the two speeches made to the Assembly of the United Nations in New York by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 26th September and 16th October respectively.

Mr. Thomas: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for his reply, may I ask him if he is aware that the "Manchester Guardian" on Saturday, 28th September, issued a statement as coming from the Foreign Office, and this had such wide publicity that it would hardly come under the heading of "a usually well-informed source"?

Mr. Bevin: I have great respect for the "Manchester Guardian" and its editor, but I am not really responsible for it.

29 OCT 1947

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* 97. Mr. George Thomas,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, if it was with his approval that an official announcement was issued from the Foreign Office on Friday September 26th to the effect that Britain would not concern herself with handing over authority to any racial group in Palestine and that a period of anarchy might follow; and what is the policy of H.M. Government in carrying out its evacuation of Palestine. *

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C.R.M.
28/x.

Notes for Supplementaries.

On the 2nd October the High Commissioner for Palestine had an interview in Jerusalem with Arab and Jewish leaders in which he emphasised the need for Arab-Jewish agreement and pointed out that, failing such agreement, their intransigence could only result in bloodshed, misery and economic chaos when we left Palestine. A warning on these lines was broadcast by the Palestine broadcasting system on the 5th October.

DRAFT REPLY
to
Mr. George Thomas

x 97 29th Oct.

The Honourable Member's question no doubt ~~obviously~~ refers to an agency message published on the 26th September which attributed these opinions to "usually well-informed quarters". No [~~official~~] statement or communiqué on this subject has~~, however,~~ been issued by the Foreign Office. The policy of H.M.G. as regards British withdrawal from Palestine is set out ~~contained~~ in the two speeches made to the Assembly of the United Nations in New York by (my Right Honourable Friend) the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 26th September and 16th October respectively.

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES.

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PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

PALESTINE

Government Policy

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Mr. Bevin: I have great respect for the "Manchester Guardian" and its editor, but I am not really responsible for it.

29 OCT 1947

362

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 10217 22
3 NOV

Registry Number	E 10217/937/31
FROM	P.Q.
No.	Mr Grenfell
Dated	29 Oct
Received in Registry	3 Nov.

Supply of Arms to Arab Countries.

Mr Grenfell asked whether adequate precautions are being taken to ensure that arms and ammunition supplied to Arab Countries shall not be used for aggression against Palestine, or sent to Palestine for illegal purposes by Arabs. Mr Bevin: Military equipment furnished has been supplied to meet bona fide defence and internal security requirements. Precautions are taken to prevent smuggling

Last Paper.

10216

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

q/. Bagdad no. 365
Beirut no. 222
Damascus no. 192
Jedda no. 169
Amman no. 189.
Cairo no. 777
Nov 12

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
12/11	3/8/48

Next Paper.

10230

(Minutes.)

J.G.S. Beith
Nov. 3

Copy to Bagdad
Beirut
Damascus
Jedda
Amman
Cairo

4/xi

32003 F.O.P

EASTERN

E 23

Parliamentary Question

* 99. Mr. Grenfell,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether adequate precautions are being taken to ensure that arms and ammunition supplied to Arab countries by His Majesty's Government shall not be used for aggression against Palestine or sent into Palestine for illegal purposes by Arabs. *

29 OCT 1947

Lab

Gower

E 10217

3 NOV

I submit a draft reply which has Colonial Office concurrence on the departmental level. I think the reply answers the question quite fairly. "Aggression against Palestine" at present means aggression against the British Government of Palestine. Later on it will presumably constitute aggression against a Government approved by the United Nations, and that point is dealt with in the Notes for Supplementaries.

Arms smuggling is naturally a ~~the~~ major preoccupation of the Palestine Government, but it is not limited to one side only. As the Colonial Office consider Mr. Grenfell to be a fairly helpful M.P., I have refrained from specifically making this debating point that Jews are just as likely as Arabs to be storing away arms.

J.G.S. Beith

(J.G.S. Beith)
27th October, 1947.

I have somewhat altered the draft. It is dangerous to talk in this connexion about what may happen when we are no longer in Palestine".

B A B Burrows
28.X

The second sentence is rather hurtful to Arab susceptibilities & wd. be better omitted

25 OCT

857.

omitted if it is thought that the answer wd. be adequate without it especially in view of the forthcoming talks in Baghdad with the Iraqis. C.F.A. Warner 28/x.

Arms and Ammunition

25. **Mr. Grenfell** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether adequate precautions are being taken to ensure that arms and ammunition supplied to Arab countries by His Majesty's Government shall not be used for aggression against Palestine or sent into Palestine for illegal purposes by Arabs.

Mr. Bevin: Military equipment furnished by His Majesty's Government to Arab countries has been supplied to meet *bona fide* defence and internal security requirements. The strictest precautions are taken to prevent any smuggling of arms into Palestine.

Mr. House: Can greater precautions be taken against the stealing of rifles and Sten guns? I understand that on the Arab side £50 is paid for a rifle and £200 for a Sten gun.

Mr. Wilkes: In view of the fact that at present we have military missions in all the major Arab countries and that there is a constant flow of supplies to them, and in view also of the fact that on 14th May last the Minister of Defence informed me that we have recently supplied 40 military aircraft, 298 carriers, and 38 scout cars to one of those countries, is it not time that a review was made of that flow of military supplies?

Mr. Bevin: Now that we are under treaty obligations to the Arab countries and they are partners with us in defence, we have no intention of breaking those agreements.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the House is to rely on newspaper reports of the speeches made by the Colonial Secretary to the United Nations for its knowledge of His Majesty's Government's policy or whether any statement is ever going to be made to the House?

Mr. Bevin: That does not arise on this Question.

29 OCT 1947

RECEIVED IN C.B.
31 OCT 1947
SENT TO DEP.

* 99. Mr. Grenfell,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether adequate precautions are being taken to ensure that arms and ammunition supplied to Arab countries by His Majesty's Government shall not be used for aggression against Palestine or sent into Palestine for illegal purposes by Arabs. *

Draft Reply

Mr. Grenfell,

No. 99. 29th October.

Military equipment furnished by H.M. Government to Arab countries has been supplied to meet bona fide defence and internal security requirements. [New ~~R~~requests for the supply of war material which appeared to be in excess of such legitimate requirements would be most carefully scrutinised.] The strictest precautions are taken to prevent any smuggling of arms into Palestine.

✓

Crm 28/x

Notes for Supplementaries.

In the case of Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt, we have treaty obligations dating back for a number of years to help with the equipment and maintenance of their armies. We have supplied arms to these countries in the normal discharge of these obligations.

The Arab countries have a perfect right to/

This has not been seen by Mr. Mayhew.

to maintain armies and we have no reason to believe that they have built up their forces with the express purpose of intervening in Palestine.

H.M. Government still hope for, and will continue to work for, a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

E

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

27

Arms and Ammunition

25. **Mr. Grenfell** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether adequate precautions are being taken to ensure that arms and ammunition supplied to Arab countries by His Majesty's Government shall not be used for aggression against Palestine or sent into Palestine for illegal purposes by Arabs.

Mr. Bevin: Military equipment furnished by His Majesty's Government to Arab countries has been supplied to meet *bona fide* defence and internal security requirements. The strictest precautions are taken to prevent any smuggling of arms into Palestine.

Mr. House: Can greater precautions be taken against the stealing of rifles and Sten guns? I understand that on the Arab side £50 is paid for a rifle and £200 for a Sten gun.

Mr. Wilkes: In view of the fact that at present we have military missions in all the major Arab countries and that there is a constant flow of supplies to them, and in view also of the fact that on 14th May last the Minister of Defence informed me that we have recently supplied 40 military aircraft, 298 carriers, and 38 scout cars to one of those countries, is it not time that a review was made of that flow of military supplies?

Mr. Bevin: Now that we are under treaty obligations to the Arab countries and they are partners with us in defence, we have no intention of breaking those agreements.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the House is to rely on newspaper reports of the speeches made by the Colonial Secretary to the United Nations for its knowledge of His Majesty's Government's policy or whether any statement is ever going to be made to the House?

Mr. Bevin: That does not arise on this Question.

29 OCT 1947

36

362

E

E 10230

28

PALESTINE

3 NOV

1947

Registry Number } E10230/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM
U.K. Del
No. New York.
Dated 31st 45
Received in Registry } 31 Oct
3 Nov

Return of Mr Creech Jones to U.K.

for HK from Sir A Cadogan. Subject agreement with Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary will leave New York. Most discussions in Sub Committee look like being prolonged well into next week. and no U.K. major statement seems necessary yet.

ADDRESSED JERUSALEM 136

Last Paper.

10217

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

To Mathieson C.O.
M.I.3a.
M.O.4
Admlty
A.M.
Nov 4

(Action completed.) 10/11

(Index.) 3/1/48

Next Paper.

10231

(*Minutes.*)

U.N. (P.I.) Dept. 8/11

R. S. Bains
Nov. 3

RG
4/xi

In P.P. Extract "Manchester Guardian" 6/11

Mr Scott is seeing Mr Burrows and I hope that will keep him straight. JB Nov. 10

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Cypher OTP **DEPARTMENTAL No. 1**

FROM NEW YORK TO JERUSALEM

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 136 D. 12.01 a.m. 1st November 1947.
31st October 1947. R. 7.05 a.m. 1st November 1947.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 3145

E 10230
3 NOV

IMMEDIATE

Please pass Immediate to Jerusalem.

[Begins]

Personal for High Commissioner from Secretary of State for Colonies.

With agreement of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary I am obliged to leave New York for England tomorrow. Discussions in Sub-Committee on Palestine look like being prolonged well into next week and no major statement of United Kingdom attitude is likely to be necessary for a little time yet. You will appreciate that with the African Governors' Conference, the Ceylon and Development Corporation bills and several other major matters on hand it is extremely difficult just now for me to be away from London longer. I shall of course return to New York if that should be necessary and shall in any case be in close touch with the Minister of State and Sir A. Cadogan here. United Kingdom is well represented on the technical side by Martin, MacGillivray and Beeley and the difficulties of the civil administration in the present uncertainty will be kept well before United Nations Delegations. I have had many talks with Arabs and Jews on the importance of accommodation and the problem of enforcement but it is still obscure as to how matters will emerge from the Palestine Committee.

[Ends].

Foreign Office please pass to Colonial Office.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

TTTTTT

NOV

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.

Cutting dated 194

K 30

INDEXED

12230 | 9171

PALESTINE

Mr. Creech Jones returns to this country to-day to consult with the Cabinet on the latest developments in the Palestinian debate at the United Nations Assembly. The moment is well chosen. For in spite of the negative—one might almost say obstructive—attitude of the British Government the Assembly has made good progress. Sensibly assuming that partition in some form will be adopted (though it has not yet been put to the vote) the Committee is now concentrating on practical proposals for putting it into effect. There are only three of these that matter, put forward by Russia, the United States, and Guatemala respectively, and all have much in common. The Committee has therefore appointed a "working group," consisting of these three countries together with Canada, to work out a compromise plan which all of them can accept. The Committee no doubt hopes that if it can thus present a practical proposal which already has the backing of Russia and the United States it will have a better chance of obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority in the Assembly than a simple resolution in favour of partition. This is probably correct. There is still, however, one difficulty. Neither the "working group" nor the committee nor the General Assembly, nor, one suspects, Mr. Creech Jones himself, yet knows what kind of plan is favoured by the British Government and to what extent this country is prepared to co-operate in carrying it out. It is high time the Government made its position clear. Mr. Bevin has sulked too long. So far our attitude has been that of a spoilt child who refuses to play a game because he cannot win it. Other nations may reasonably feel that since Britain is partly responsible for the mess and has most to gain from a final settlement the least we can do is to show willing.

Russia and the United States are agreed that Palestine should be divided into independent Jewish and Arab States. They agree also that the long transitional period suggested by the United Nations Palestine Committee must be cut down to a minimum—Russia says a year, the United States six months—in order to stop endless bickering and to allow the British Government to withdraw as soon as possible. They agree that during this interim period the United Nations should appoint a commission to supervise the transition, though the United States wishes the Assembly to be the supreme authority, while Russia prefers the Security Council. So far, so good, and there is nothing here to which the British Government can reasonably object. Neither Russia nor the United States, however, has so far suggested any force to keep order during that period. The United States, having dropped her first idea of an international police force, has requested Britain to accept this responsibility for six months; Russia, so far as one can gather, would leave it to the armed forces of the Jewish and Arab States. Only Guatemala has proposed a United Nations force, provided by the small nations but "maintained and equipped by the Big Five." It has been obvious throughout the debates that none of the other members shares the British Government's fears of violent warfare, and this must remain a matter

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1 2

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Reference:- FO 371/61886

to supervise the transition, though the United States wishes the Assembly to be the supreme authority, while Russia prefers the Security Council. So far, so good, and there is nothing here to which the British Government can reasonably object. Neither Russia nor the United States, however, has so far suggested any force to keep order during that period. The United States, having dropped her first idea of an international police force, has requested Britain to accept this responsibility for six months; Russia, so far as one can gather, would leave it to the armed forces of the Jewish and Arab States. Only Guatemala has proposed a United Nations force, provided by the small nations but "maintained and equipped by the Big Five." It has been obvious throughout the debates that none of the other members shares the British Government's fears of violent warfare, and this must remain a matter of opinion. But Russia may well be right in thinking that, provided the other Arab States do not interfere, the Jews are perfectly capable of defending their own State and of maintaining order within it. It is not an ideal solution, but it is not as crude as it may seem at first sight. After all, if the British Government were to walk out, as it still threatens to do, without waiting for any agreement or alternative authority, that is almost certainly what would happen.

What, then, is Britain asked to do? We are not being asked to take responsibility for the partition of Palestine but only to accept the decision of the United Nations that partition is, in the circumstances, the best and only solution. We are not being asked to enforce partition but only, when we withdraw, to hand over control of the Jewish areas to the Jews and of the Arab areas to the Arabs. No doubt so long as British troops remain in Palestine we should be expected to intervene if we saw a Jew murdering an Arab or an Arab murdering a Jew, but we should presumably do that in any case. We can hardly object that this will lead to chaos, since our own proposal, to leave Palestine without a settlement, would have the same result "only more so." No doubt we should also be expected to co-operate with the United Nations Commission in administering the country during the interval, but this too does not seem an unreasonable request to one of the "Big Five." The only serious objection is the danger that the other Arab States will refuse to accept partition and will try to prevent it by force. It is still difficult to believe that they would risk this in the face of opposition from Britain, Russia, and the United States, but this is surely something which might yield to preliminary discussions between the Governments concerned. Neither the State Department nor the Kremlin is altogether innocent, and they would hardly have supported partition if they had thought it meant war. If there are other objections, then surely it is up to the British Government to make practical proposals of its own and to abandon its present attitude of smug indifference. To go on repeating that we can only accept a settlement which is agreeable to both Jews and Arabs when we know that no such settlement is possible is both exasperating and dishonest. Foreigners must not be judged too harshly if they suspect that the real reason for our refusal to help is Mr. Bevin's determination that, come what may, the Jews shall not have their State in Palestine.

768

E

E 10231 | 31

3 NOV

PALESTINE

1947

Registry Number } E10231/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del

No. New York

Dated 3168

Received in Registry 1 Nov

3 ~

Palestine Situation

Refers F.O. tel 3737 (E10197/46/9) Refers H.M.G. summary of Mr Herschel Johnson's statement. It is understood that Soviet Representative will make further statement. Better to await this before deciding what further clarification of our position is required at this stage. Effort will be made to dispel impression that U.S. Proposal had H.M.G. backing.

Last Paper.

10230.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Washington P.O.

M.I.9.

M.O.4

Admiralty

C.M.

(on E10254) Nov 4

Tel. New York

3761.

3 Nov.

8/P.A. nov 5

(Action completed.)

5/11

(Index.)

3/11/48

Next Paper.

E 10250

(Minutes.)

Please see the attached copy of this telegram with a minute by Sir Orme Sargent. I submit a draft telegram to New York in the sense of that minute.

The two statements by Mr. Beeley in Sub-Committee Two, which [illegible] are less equivocal and more satisfactory than Mr. Martin's statement in Sub-Committee One, will be found in E.9997 (Flag A) and E.10091 (Flag B). Mr. Martin's statement will be found in E.10213 (Flag C). American strategy is becoming very clear (see paragraph 10 of New York telegram No. 3165 in E.10254 (Flag D). The aim is to pin H.M.G. down to implementing a scheme of partition during the period while they are physically compelled to keep British troops in Palestine owing to the time required for the withdrawal of troops and stores. It is playing into American hands to adopt the general tone taken in Mr. Martin's statement at Flag C.

N.B. I asked Mr T. Smith, C.O., whether we wd concur in a tel. on the lines of this draft. He agreed to our sending it but thought it a F.O. matter

J.G.S. Beith

(J.G.S. Beith)

3rd November, 1947.

B.A.B. Burrows

3.XI

Seen by Sir O. Sargent

Tel. sent

B.A.B.B.

3.XI

Wt. 24772/717 17395 10/38 F.O.P.

E 32

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP **WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.**

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3168 D. 11.13 p.m. 1st November 1947
R. 4.31 a.m. 2nd November 1947

1st November 1947.
Repeated to Washington and Jerusalem.

E 10231
3 NOV

IMMEDIATE.
GIANT.
SECRET

N/P

Your telegram No. 3737 was received after Colonial Secretary's departure.

2. You will now have seen my telegram No. 3155 containing full summary of United Kingdom representative's comments on Herschel Johnson's statement in Palestine Sub-committee One. These were on lines approved by Colonial Secretary. In subsequent discussion United Kingdom representative also quoted from Colonial Secretary's statement of 26th September (see my telegram No. 3165). E10254

3. It is understood that Soviet representative will make a statement on Monday and it seems best to await this before deciding what further clarification of our position is required at this stage.

4. It will be seen from my telegrams Nos. 3063 and 3102 (paragraph 3) that there is some appearance of inconsistency between the line taken in commenting on the American proposals and the more definite declaration of the United Kingdom representative Sub-committee Two with reference to the similar problem created by the Arab proposal.

5. In the meantime efforts will continue to be made to dispel the impression conveyed by certain press reports that the United States proposal has been put forward in agreement with His Majesty's Government.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 143.

[Copies sent to Cypher Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

V V V

NOV

Eastern Dept

Please [illegible]

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3168 D. 11.13 p.m. 1st November 1947
R. 4.31 a.m. 2nd November 1947

1st November 1947.
Repeated to Washington and Jerusalem.

IMMEDIATE.
GIANT.
SECRET

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Exact Martin's [illegible] 3155 [illegible]

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Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 143.

[Copies sent to Cypher Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

v v v

Registry No. E 10231/951/31 **OUT FILE**

F.O. 34

3/11 1947

Despatched 11 30 P M.

Draft.

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

U.K. Delegation NEW YORK

Telegram.

No. 3761

(Date) Nov: 3rd.

Repeat to :-
WASHINGTON 11405
JERUSALEM

[Flag A & B]

Jer. S. Beirut Nov. 3

Cypher.

Distribution :-
~~World Organisation~~
Dept No 1

Copies to C.O.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
5 NOV 1947
SENT TO DEPT.

IMPORTANT

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 3168 [of November 1st: Palestine] paragraph 4.

Following from Sargent for Cadogan.

We entirely approve the line taken by the U.K. representative in Sub-Committee 2 as reported in your telegrams Nos. 3063 and 3102. It seems to us a pity that the U.K. representative in Sub-Committee 1 was not more categorical in re-emphasizing H.M.G.'s determination not to be responsible for implementing a settlement unless it is agreed by Jews and Arabs. It is most important that in all our statements we should concentrate on this cardinal fact, & avoid most carefully any suggestion that we can ~~by~~ be deflected from our attitude by financial assistance or any other means.

O.S. Nov 3

[Copy sent to M.E. Secretariat]

8pm

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

35

OUT FILE

E10231/951/31

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK
(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3761
3rd November, 1947. D. 11.30 p.m. 3rd November, 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 11405
Jerusalem

IMPORTANT
CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 3168 [of November 1st: Palestine] paragraph 4.

Following from Sargent for Cadogan.

We entirely approve the line taken by the United Kingdom representative in Sub-Committee 2 as reported in your telegrams Nos. 3063 and 3108. It seems to us a pity that the United Kingdom representative in Sub-Committee 1 was not more categorical in re-emphasising His Majesty's Government's determination not to be responsible for implementing a settlement unless it is agreed by Jews and Arabs. It is most important that in all our statements we should concentrate on this cardinal fact, and avoid most carefully any suggestion that we can be deflected from our attitude by financial resistance or any other means.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

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364

1947

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PALESTINE

E 10250
3 NOV

36

Registry Number	E10250/951/31
TELEGRAM FROM	U.K. Del
No.	New York.
Dated	3151
Received in Registry	31 Oct 3 Nov

Further remarks by Herschel Johnson.

Refers New York tel 3150 (E10214/951/31) transmits full text of Press Release containing remarks made by Mr Herschel Johnson to correspondents after morning's meeting of Pal. Committee are.

(*Minutes.*)

J. S. Beith
Nov. 4

4/XI

Last Paper.

10231

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8 Mathieson C.O.
M.I.3a
M.O.4
Admiralty
A.M.
Nov 4
(on E10250)

(Action completed.) 5/11

(Index.)

Next Paper.

10251

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

F37

En Clair **WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION**

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3151 D. 1.29 a.m. 1st November, 1947
31st October, 1947 R. 8.45 a.m. 1st November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

E 10250
3 NOV

E10214/90/31

My telegram No.3150.

Following is full text of United States delegation press release containing remarks made by Herschel Johnson to correspondents after this morning's meeting of Palestine sub-committee one.

(Begins).

"Well gentlemen the statement I made on behalf of our delegation this morning is in the nature of a suggestion because of the nature of the sub-committee". It is not in any sense a final decision either by the United States or by the sub-committee and certainly not of the ad hoc committee, which will have to make the final recommendation to the Assembly. It is merely a plan which we believe would offer a reasonable hope of success in implementing the partition recommendation of the majority of the investigating commission.

There are certain fundamental facts which are premises which we might remind ourselves of. It is perfectly clear from the report of the special committee on Palestine, that is the subject of all this discussion, and from statements that have been made by the representatives of various countries in the ad hoc committee, in the open debate, that there is pretty general agreement all around with respect to an early termination of the mandate. It is also clear from statements made by a representative of Great Britain that the British Government regards the early termination of the mandate and withdrawal of its forces and administration as desirable. In fact they have said they are going to get out.

Now the majority report of the special committee on Palestine, as you will all remember, recommends a two year transitional period before final independence of the two states becomes effective, and the date they give for the beginning of that period is already past now - September 1947 - but they do recommend a two year transitional period.

We feel however and I have suggested it to this sub-committee that it would be possible to shorten very materially the time between the effective date of the recommendations that the General Assembly may make and the real independence of the two states. Our delgation thinks that complete and early independence can be fixed on a practical basis and geared in with the plans of the mandatory power for withdrawing its administration and the troops that are now there maintaining public order. It can be arranged so that the mandatory power can simultaneously with withdrawing its administration and troops turn over all Governmental responsibility, including that for the maintenance of law and order, to the authorities for the new Jewish and Arab states.

This procedure would make it unnecessary for the General Assembly to provide in its recommendations for a transitional period under a trusteeship or any other arrangement, and it would make unnecessary the establishment of a special United Nations force for maintaining law and order during the interim period.

Of course it is absolutely essential for a decision to be reached in the sub-committee on this point because if the idea of having the mandatory turn over its sovereign powers and its administration responsibility to two independent states (is accepted by the sub-committee) the various provisions in the (UNSCOP) report which provide for transitional period machinery would have to be deleted or modified.

Now we, have also suggested that the General Assembly, appoint a small and very competent commission with a High Commissioner at the head of it - we suggested that it might be composed of three top people - to go out to Palestine as soon as possible after the effective date of the Assembly's action, to act in an advisory and guiding capacity with the leaders of the groups who will become independent states, or with the independent states, on this hypothetical date of July 1st (1948). Also to work in collaboration with the British authorities still in Palestine and who, until the termination of the mandate, are still responsible for its Government and for the maintenance of law and order. We believe that a small commission composed of men chosen for their personal qualifications, demonstrated by experience and public record, can give the most effective assistance to the leaders of the Arab and Jewish groups who are going to have to form governments in these states. It also can act as a sort of catalytic agent without the mandatory. We believe too that if this plan were adopted the British Government, as a good member of the United Nations, would help in every practical way possible. It would certainly be in their interest to do so and to have a peaceful transition.

The date of July 1st 1948 was thrown out as a suggestion. That is the earliest date suggested in any of the plans I believe. One of the resolutions put into the ad hoc committee mentioned September 1949. I forget which country put that in, but our suggested date, in the absence of any knowledge on our part of the precise date when the mandatory will withdraw, would seem to fit in with practical possibilities when we know that there are many thousands of British troops and a heavy Governmental machinery there that cannot be removed in a day.

We think too that this commission which would go out there should be sent out as the representative and agent of the General Assembly. It naturally could not have any greater powers than the General Assembly itself has. Its powers would be that of recommendation. However the self interest as we see it of all the parties concerned would it seems to us have an impelling effect on the possibility of usefulness of this commission. If a definite date for independence, is set, and both the Jewish and the Arab leaders and their peoples know that on that date they are going to become responsible for order in their own house, we think that it would be a very strong motivation for their getting to work and for seeking wise and experienced and unbiased advice, which is offered to them with the greatest possible goodwill by the United Nations. We feel also that knowing that the mandatory is leaving they will be wise enough to profit from the counsel and suggestions of the heads of the mandatory states.

Now in regard to the questions of public order, which is one of the first questions raised by anybody in consideration of this plan, I would like to make it perfectly clear that according to our thinking with respect to our plan the two states themselves will be absolutely sovereign on the effective date of their independence and they themselves will be responsible for the maintenance of their own public order. Naturally the most impelling motive they will have will be their own self interest. During this period the United Nations Commission also would have the responsibility for formulating a recommendation for the setting up of a United Nations trusteeship, or whatever other plan might be finally adopted, for the Government of the city of Jerusalem and the contiguous territory within such limits as might be finally recommended. We do not know yet what will be the precise territorial limits of any of these three states, that is the Arab, the Jewish and the free territory of Jerusalem.

Now I have no doubt that every one of you can think of possible difficulties that may arise as all the rest of us have thought of, and if I can help in any way by giving you some idea of the way our delegation has speculated on these difficulties and in what way they might be met, - if I can I will be glad to answer your questions.

One other thing I had in mind to say. The question also arises of what body this United Nations group would be responsible to, and I think that the very terms of our proposal give the answer. It is responsible to the General Assembly. If another situation should arise however where there will be a real threat to international peace and security the jurisdiction of that particular situation might well pass to the Security Council. We do not feel however that it is possible at this stage for our delegation, least of all or for the committee or for the General Assembly, to anticipate by any kind of present action every possible difficulty that may arise. The most we can do is to lay down a plan which we hope is fair and we want to be fair to everybody concerned, even if it does not give everybody everything they ask for. With a certain amount of goodwill and with some wise counsel on the part of competent people, the difficult transition period will be bridged and the two states become viable, both politically and economically, in a very short time. We feel strongly that the placing on the shoulders of the Jewish and Arab leaders in their states the full responsibility for their own future will be in some ways the best guarantee of its success. That may be too hopeful a statement, but as long as someone else is responsible, the people who are most concerned are not likely to progress as rapidly in their thinking and actions as when they must bear the entire responsibility themselves for these actions.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to High Commissioner Jerusalem as my telegram No.135.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

k k k

265

1947

E

PALESTINE

41

E 10251

3 NOV

Registry Number } E10251/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3156.

Received in Registry } 1 Nov

3 "

Palestine. Sub Committee one.

Refers, New York tel 3122 (E 10177/957/31)

Committee resumed in private meeting yesterday Herschel Johnson was asked to clarify certain points of his statement,

Gives text.

Last Paper.

10250

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8, Mathieson. CO.

M.I.3a.

M.O.4

Admty

O.M.

Nov. 4

(on E10230)

(*Minutes.*)

See E10231

JB Nov. 3

(Action completed.)

5/11

(Index.)

4/8/48

Next Paper.

10252

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP. WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3156. D. 11.41 a.m. 1st November 1947.

1st November 1947. R. 11.0 p.m. 1st November 1947.

Repeated to: High Commissioner, Palestine and
Washington, Saving.

E 10251
3 NOV

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

E

My telegram No.3122.

Palestine Sub-Committee One resumed its private meetings yesterday. After Herschel Johnson had made the statement of which the full text is given in my telegram No.3150 he was asked to clarify certain points.

2. In reply to Venezuela he said that the concurrence of the United Kingdom was of course a pre-requisite and that the plan assumed that the Arabs and the Jews would both set about immediately to create the administrative machinery which would take over from the Mandatory Power and that the United Kingdom would co-operate in assisting to form that machinery. The United States he said believed the date to be within the general framework of the plan of the United Kingdom to withdraw in six months as announced in a public statement. When the delegate of Venezuela expressed doubt whether the Arab State would be willing to set up their administrative machine in the time set Johnson replied that that contingency must be envisaged but that he felt sure that an elementary feeling of self-interest would impel the Arabs to take some measures to fill the gap in administrative functions. There were certainly good grounds to think that the Jews would set up their machine without delay and if the Arabs were reluctant to take similar steps it might be that the United Nations High Commissioner could carry on during a further period on an ad hoc basis to assist the Arabs to bring their machine into operation; of course in such case the High Commissioner would have to report first to the appropriate body of the United Nations. It was certainly possible that the Arabs might be slow in getting started; delay might be caused by the Mufti who was not exactly a catalysing agent; but most people have the instinct to live and survive and sooner or later they would do something. As to the use of subversive forces on a large scale he felt sure that the presence of an United Nations High Commission of high

calibre would serve as a genuine deterrent and that this body would have the loyal co-operation in this matter of both the Jewish and Arab authorities and the assistance and valuable advice of the United Kingdom.

3. The representative of the Soviet Union asked from what body of the United Nations the proposed High Commissioner would emanate, what body would it contact if it had to use force, to what body would it report and to what body would it be subordinate. To these questions Johnson replied that the United States would propose that the Commission should be set up by the General Assembly; it would naturally have no greater power than that of the Assembly itself; it would not have power to act and its functions would be advisory to assist the Mandatory Power in setting up the new States and the Joint Economic Union; the effective authority until the new States came into being would be the Mandatory Power. Trouble would arise only if one side refused to co-operate; if this trouble was such as to be a menace to the peace of the world then the Security Council would come into operation. Meanwhile it would not be a matter for the Security Council; it would be simply a matter of recommendations and therefore one for the General Assembly. In reply to further questions on this point by the Czechoslovak delegate Johnson said that the Security Council might in certain circumstances enter into the picture but not at all necessarily. By the time the United Kingdom had withdrawn the United Nations Commission would have gained considerable experience and if the Arabs were slow to co-operate the Commission might perhaps find it best to effect a temporary ad hoc extension of its authority from the Jerusalem Trust area to take in parts of the area allocated to the Arab State. (This he explained was a personal idea and not that of the United States Government). If the Arabs showed no sign of attempting to set up the machinery necessary for the maintenance of law and order in their State then a plan similar to that which had been proposed by Guatemala for an international force might be appropriate; the States from which such a force would be contributed should have no national interest in Palestine of any kind either political or commercial.

4. To a further question by the Czechoslovak delegate as to whether the High Commission would be a political Commission or a Commission of Experts the United States representative replied that the United States idea was that the Commission should consist of three people and that the chief of them should be a man of proven calibre chosen on personal merits on account of a record of eminent public service and not on account of any political considerations or as representative of any particular country. In that sense it would be a political Commission but the three Commissioners would be advised by a body of experts in various fields.

5. Venezuela suggested that there might be a conflict of opinion between the British High Commissioner and the United Nations High Commissioner and that if the advice of the latter was not taken by the former on, for example, the formation of armies which the new States would require for their defence immediately after the withdrawal of the Mandatory the prestige of the United Nations might be affected. Herschel Johnson replied that he did not anticipate that such a difficulty would arise. Mandatory as represented by the High Commissioner was a reservoir of vast experience and he was convinced of goodwill. United Kingdom had every interest to ensure that the handover of authority to the new States should be effected in an orderly and peaceful manner and he was sure the United Nations could count on the full assistance of the British administration. If the right man was selected for the post of United Nations High Commissioner there would be no friction. And the Arab and Jewish Authorities responsible for modelling the machinery of the new States would themselves co-operate to ensure a smooth handover. We must rely he said on the high character of those concerned and on the self-interest of the two future States to see that the operation goes well; there was no need to anticipate by present action the contingencies mentioned by the Delegate of Venezuela.

6. Chairman said that at first sight the plan appeared to him to have merit particularly in that it provided for a shortening of the transition period. There were two points however at which he thought it might with advantage be modified. Firstly he completely agreed as to what had been said in regard to using the experience of the British Administration but was it necessary to leave responsibility with the British during the period of handover? Might not the United Nations High Commissioner take over control from the British High Commissioner at the outset? Secondly could not 1st July 1948 be fixed as a definite date by which all British troops would be withdrawn? Herschel Johnson replied that it was necessary to be practical as well as idealistic. The large number of British troops in Palestine could not be withdrawn in a day and with 80,000 of them still in Palestine a United Nations authority could not be set up there. "We should have to get the assent of the British Government for that and who knows if that would be forthcoming?" Moreover it would be a very costly business for the United Nations to have to replace the British forces and civil administration. Those forces and administration were worth untold gold to the United Nations. "They are there for us to use for nothing." We must not waste our assets by recommending that the British Government should not assume the responsibility. It would not be practicable for the United Nations to attempt to govern Palestine while the British Army was still there. On the other hand it was most unlikely that the British Government would during this

period attempt to enforce its view on the United Nations Commission in regard to such matters as the pace and form of the handover. The British Government would be responsible for law and order and not for the shape which the future States should assume.

7. Delegate of Guatemala said that the Mandatory Power had previously stated that it was not going to implement a plan which would necessitate the repelling of attacks by Arabs or Jews. United States proposal presupposed that the Mandatory would be willing to maintain law and order until the independent States could take over. Had the attitude of the Mandatory Power changed? If not and if the date proposed by the United States was to be adhered to how could troops of other nations be sent to Palestine to maintain law and order in the period of handover while the British forces were still there? Herschel Johnson replied that as he understood it the Mandatory Power had never denied responsibility for law and order while it was still in Palestine. The question of their troops standing aside with arms crossed in the event of trouble would not therefore arise.

8. Account of afternoon's proceedings follows.

Please pass Immediate to High Commissioner Jerusalem as my telegram No.158.

[Copy sent to Cypher Section, C.R.O. for repetition to Jerusalem.]

W:W:W:W:W

766

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 10252 | 46

3 NOV

Registry Number } E10252/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM UK Del

No. New York.

Dated 3164

Received in Registry } 1 Nov 3

Palestine Sub Committee 2

Refers New York tel 3112 (E10119/951/31)
On 31 Oct Sub Committee 2 considered the report of the working group on legal problems
Gives text of conclusions reached.

Last Paper.

10251

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8. Matheson C.O.
M.I.3a.
M.O.4
Admty
A.M.
Nov 4
(on E10230)

(Action completed.) 14/11

(Index.) 3/8/48

Next Paper.

10253

(*Minutes.*)

Mr Evans

Nov. 4

4/xi

5.11

These are very odd conclusions. Did any representative of ours participate. I imagine not as we are keeping out of the discussions

Para 1

(A) Cannot be right surely
(B) Much too categorical though it is a view which quite suits us
(C) Probably right.
(D) Quite wrong I should

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

say. In any case if they are right on B they can hardly appeal to the mandate at all.

(E) Correct

(F) This is surely a political not a legal question.

Para. 2

Without knowing the proposed or possible recommendations in connexion with which these questions would be referred to the I.C.J. it is difficult to say how far the reference would be suitable or useful. Some of them look a little odd in their present form.

Have we any comments from the Del.?

G. G. Fitzmaurice 10/

U.N. Dept: E. Dept are presumably waiting for a copy of the report before going into this in detail?

S. Hebblethwaite 13/11

We have had no comments so far. This is all quite unrealistic stuff. Sir G. Fitzmaurice agrees that no further action is required.

JB Nov. 14

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP   WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3164.   D. 9.16. p.m. 1st November 1947.

1st November 1947.   R. 3.0. a.m. 2nd November 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Washington, Saving.

E 10252
3 NOV

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

My telegram No. 3112.

Palestine Committee.

On the 31st October Sub Committee 2 considered the report of its working group on legal problems. The report reaches inter alia the following conclusions:

(A) The mandate for Palestine was inconsistent with Article 22 of the league covenant;

(B) With the dissolution of the league the legal basis for the mandate has disappeared;

(C) The undertaking to establish a Jewish national home has already been fulfilled;

(D) Article 28 of the mandate dealing with the event of its termination speaks of the authority succeeding the mandatory as "the Government of Palestine" and thus rules out partition;

(E) The United Nations has not inherited the powers of the league of nations in respect of mandated territories and has no jurisdiction over them unless and until they are brought within the trusteeship system;

(F) In view of the Colonial Secretary's two statements no further action is required of the General Assembly on the original request of the United Kingdom for advice. This item should therefore be struck off the Assembly agenda.

2. It is suggested that the following questions

/inter

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inter alia should be submitted to the International Court of Justice for advisory opinions:

(A) The bearing on Palestine of pledges given to the Arabs during the first world war;

(B) The validity and interpretation of the Balfour Declaration;

(C) The validity and interpretation of the mandate;

(D) The competence of the United Nations to recommend or enforce the partition of Palestine;

(E) The competence of the United Nations to impose conditions for the recognition of the independence of the proposed Arab and Jewish states;

(F) The competence of the United Nations to establish a permanent trusteeship over the Jerusalem area.

3. The report like that on displaced persons has gone to a drafting committee. The Sub Committee will meet again on the 3rd November.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 139.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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1947	E PALESTINE	E 10253 58 3 NOV

Registry Number } E10253/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3166

Received in Registry } 1, Nov
3 ~

Palestine Sub Committee One.

Refers New York tel 3165 (E10254/951/31) when discussion on boundaries resumed Chairman explained that he and the Rapporteur (Fabregat) had consulted Shertok and [illegible] in regard to the modification which Jewish Agency had prepared and had drawn up revised boundaries for consideration by the Sub Committee

(*Minutes.*)

Now see summary of present position in the Sub-Cttees.

JB Nov. 6

Last Paper.

10252

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8, Washington - C.O.
M.I.3a
MO4
Admty
A.M.
Nov 4
(on E 10254)

(Action completed.) 8/11

(Index.) 3/8/48

Next Paper.

10254

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

6

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP **WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION**

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3166 D. 10.32 p.m. 1st November, 1947.
1st November, 1947. R. 4.1 a.m. 2nd November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington
Jerusalem

E 10253
3 NOV

IMMEDIATE
GIANT

My telegram No. 3165.

When the discussion on boundaries was resumed in Palestine Sub-committee One yesterday afternoon the chairman explained that he and the Rapporteur (Fabregat) had consulted Shertok and Mohn in regard to the modifications which the Jewish agency had proposed and had drawn up revised boundaries for consideration by the sub-committee. They had worked on the principle of taking the UNSCOP lines as a basis and had then taken into consideration the Jewish agency's proposals and also the general remarks of the United States delegation contained in the statement read on 29th October (see my telegram No. 3117). They had finally decided to accept the UNSCOP line at all points where it coincided with the Jewish agency's line except in two areas near Qalqiliya and near Jaffa. Pruszynski then proceeded to detail the various amendments which he and the Rapporteur were proposing. It is not proposed to describe these here but Pruszynski's report setting out these proposals and his reasons for them should be available by Monday; a copy will be sent by air bag. It was clear from his explanations that he and Fabregat had been largely guided by the Jewish agency's arguments had not checked the statistics supporting these arguments and had generally disregarded Mohn's advice.

2. Further discussion of boundaries was postponed until members had had time to examine the chairman's proposals.

3. The United Kingdom representative proposes to seek a suitable opportunity to correct the most glaring of the inaccurate information and figures put forward by the Jewish agency.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 141.

[Copies sent to Cypher Section C.R.O. for repetition to Jerusalem]

F F F

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E 10254 52

3 NOV

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number E10254/951/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3165

Received in Registry 1, Nov

3 ~

Palestine Sub Committee One.

Refers New York tel 3156 (E 10251/951/31)

Further question was put to Herschel Johnson by South African delegate who asked what Administration would take over control from mandatory power of irrigation schemes.

etc,

Last Paper.

1025 3

(Minutes.)

See E10231

JB Nov. 3

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Mathieson C.O.

M.I.3a

M.O.4

9 Army

D.M.I.

Nov. 4

(Action completed.)

5/11

(Index.)

21/8/48

Next Paper.

10255

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

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Reference: FO 371/61886

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E 10254 353

3 NOV

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Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3165 D. Untimed 1st November, 1947
1st November, 1947. R. 5.43 a.m. 2nd November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington
Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE
GIANT

My telegram No. 3156. E

At yesterday afternoon's session of Palestine Sub-Committee One further questions were put to the United States delegate in regard to his statement. The South African delegate asked what administrative organs would take over control from the mandatory power of irrigation schemes, power supplies and security forces and how these organs would be staffed and Herschel Johnson replied that the precise manner in which the mandatory power would turn over this or that service was for decision on the spot and this was not germane to the issue. In reply to a further question from South Africa as to what attitude the mandatory should adopt towards immigration during the transitional period he said that he thought the mandatory power would be guided by whatever was recommended by the United Nations in this respect.

2. Shertok said that the Jewish Agency was not ready with its reactions to the American statement but that he had a few questions to put:

(a) was it proposed that all these recommendations of the majority plan which had particular relevance to the transitional period should be inoperative if, as the Americans proposed, the transitional period was dropped? There were many such recommendations which had intrinsic merit, such as those regarding immigration and land transfer restrictions and that by which the authority entrusted with the task of preparing Palestine for independence would be responsible to the United Nations. The United States delegate explained that under his proposal these provisions of the report would become operative by amendment and that it was not intended that they should be dropped.

(b) would the transfer of power be gradual or would it be effected at one moment?

/Herschel

1947

Herschel Johnson replied that the creation of the instruments to which transfer would be effected must be gradual but that transfer of sovereignty must be instantaneous. The mandatory would be responsible as at present until the last day.

(c) If there was to be a gradual transfer of power before 1st July 1948 to whom would it be transferred? in decisions as to the pace and form of transfer would final authority be vested in the United Nations? The United States delegate replied that the United Nations would not have this authority. It would be a matter for the mandatory. There would no doubt be consultation in these matters between the United Nations High Commission, the mandatory and the Jewish and Arab authorities but weight would have to be given to the opinion of the mandatory and in case of argument the mandatory's decision would have to prevail. "They are responsible and if it goes bad they are responsible for the result".

(d) was it intended that steps should be taken well in advance of independence to form and properly equip the military forces of the states? If so whose would be the responsibility for the formation of such forces?

To the first question Johnson replied "yes" and expressed the hope that no large military force would be necessary. "A gendarmerie or civil police should be sufficient, not an army". He did not consider that any country was likely to attack the Jewish State. He left the second unanswered.

3. There then followed the remarks by the United Kingdom representative already reported in my telegram No. 3155.

4. The Venezuelan delegate said that he agreed with the United Kingdom delegate that there would in effect be a transition period. He had begun to feel some enthusiasm after hearing the United States statement, but now the United Kingdom delegate's speech had come as a cold douche. The latter had said that the position as indicated in previous statements was unchanged. As he (the Venezuelan delegate) understood these statements, they indicated that the mandatory would not accept sole or major responsibility in the transition period.

5. The Guatemalan delegate asked whether, if the Mandatory Government did not make clear its attitude until after the Assembly, and then refused to cooperate in implementation, they must wait for another year before making any progress.

6. The Chairman recounted an anecdote about a Russian family who were expecting a baby and wrote to engage an English nurse (as English nurses were known to be best). The English nurse however wrote back asking a great many questions and in the end, in view of the delay, since the baby would not

wait, they engaged another nurse. He wondered if in view of the United Kingdom attitude, the Committee ought not to look for another nurse.

7. The delegate of Uruguay expressed general support for the United States proposal and suggested there were certain urgent problems such as the immigration of children in respect of which the U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations would have to be adapted to the new situation. The United States delegate replied that he proposed to circulate a paper indicating the manner in which his delegation suggested the U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations should be changed so that they might be consistent with the new proposal. In making these changes they had attempted to adhere as closely as possible to the majority plan.

8. The Venezuelan delegate repeated that his early enthusiasm for the United States proposal had evaporated as soon as he had heard the remarks of the United Kingdom representative and he would like the United Kingdom representative to confirm that the position was that the mandatory would not accept sole or major responsibility in the transition period. Martin replied that so as to make the position clear he could not do better than to quote the following extract from the statement made by the Secretary of State to the Ad Hoc Committee on 26th September: "His Majesty's Government are not themselves prepared to undertake the task of imposing a policy in Palestine by force of arms. Likewise in considering any proposal to the effect that His Majesty's Government should participate with others in the enforcement of a settlement, they must take into account both the inherent justice of the settlement and the extent to which force would be required to give effect to it".

9. The Czechoslovak delegate said that this was a classical case of a vicious circle. They were told that the United Kingdom cannot take a position until they know the plan as a whole; but the United Nations could not complete the plan without knowing whether the United Kingdom were likely to concur in it. "I must confess I am a little dizzy at this merry-go-round".

10. The United States delegate said that the Sub-Committee should not allow themselves to be daunted by Mr. Lisicky's dilemma. "We must accept at face value the statement made by the United Kingdom delegate that they will cooperate as a good member of the United Nations". If no further assistance can be obtained from the United Kingdom now then the U.N. must go ahead and formulate a plant and look for their cooperation later on. "Any plan to be successful will require the cooperation of the United Kingdom no matter what it is".

/11

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11. It was agreed to postpone further discussion on the United States proposal and the Sub-Committee therefore passed on to a further consideration of boundaries.

Foreign Office please repeat Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 140.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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1947

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PALESTINE

10255

3 NOV

Registry Number } E10255/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del New York.

No. 3167.

Dated

Received in Registry } 1, Nov
3 "

Palestine, Sub Committee One.
U.S. schedule of suggested changes in UNSCOP text provides for Jewish immigration during transitional period at the monthly rate recommended by the majority report of UNSCOP i.e. 6250 per month.

Last Paper.

10254

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 Mathieson CO.
1 M.I.3a.
M.O.4
admty
Q.M.
Nov 4
(on E10254)

(Minutes.)

We shd find this difficult to administer!

J. S. Bennett
Nov. 4

4/xi

(Action completed.) 5/1

(Index.) 31/8/48

Next Paper.

10256

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

E58

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP **WORLD ORGANSIATION DISTRIBUTION**

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3167 D. 10.55 p.m. 1st November, 1947.
1st November, 1947. R. 4.15 a.m. 2nd November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington
Jerusalem

10255
3 NOV

IMMEDIATE
GIANT

Palestine Sub-committee One.

The United States schedule of suggested changes to UNSCOP text (of which mention is made in paragraph 7 of my telegram No. 3165) provides for Jewish immigration during the transitional period "at the monthly rate recommended by the majority report of the UNSCOP" i.e. 6,250 per month.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 142.

[Copies sent to Cypher Section R.C.O. for repetition to Jerusalem]

F F F

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PALESTINE

E 10256

3 NOV

Registry Number } E10256/951/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3173.

Received in Registry } 2. Nov

3 —

Palestine Sub Committee one.

Refers New York tel 3122 (E10177/951/31). Committee held only one meeting [illegible] this was devoted to an examination of proposals for economic union.

Gives text

Last Paper.

10255

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Mathieson CO.

M.I.3c.

MO4

Admty

A.M.

Nov. 4

(on E10254)

(Minutes.)

E.R. Dept.

JB Nov. 4

(Action completed.)

13/11

(Index.)

3/12/48

Next Paper.

E 10304

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

10

E60

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP   WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3173.   D. 3.18. p.m. 2nd November 1947.

2nd November 1947.   R. 9.30. p.m. 2nd November 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Washington, Saving.

E 10256
3 NOV

GIANT

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of my telegram No. 3122. 9777

Palestine Sub Committee one held only one meeting yesterday. This was devoted to an examination of proposals for economic union. Granados reported that he had had discussions with representatives of Jewish Agency and U.S.A. Delegation and had drawn up a schedule of amendments which he recommended should be made to Unscop proposals. Copies of this schedule which was circulated to members of the Sub Committee are being sent by airbag today to Colonial Office and Jerusalem. Granados explained that he had not been able to accept a number of recommendations asked for by the Agency in particular those relating to:-

(A) The divisions of customs revenue,
(B) Currency and
(C) Protection of commercial interests from political boycott.

After Horowitz had explained not very convincingly the need for amendments on these three points it was decided to defer further discussion until members had had opportunity to examine them.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 144.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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771

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 10304
4 NOV

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Registry Number E10304/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Inverchapel

No. 6163

Dated Washington

Received in Registry 3 Nov
4 "

U.S. Comment on Mr Herschel Johnson's Statement.

Transmits comment on Mr Herschel Johnson statement of Oct 31 as published by U.S. Press and wireless, which as yet has not revealed a very clear picture of U.S. opinion.

Last Paper.

10256

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 Matheson. C.O.
1 Admty
D.M.
M.I5.
M04
✓ Nov 7.
(on E 10343)

(Action completed.)
G.E.M. 20/11

(Index.)
5/12/47

Next Paper.

10305

(Minutes.)

The reason why we dont want to go beyond our statement of Sept. 26 and refuse in advance to implement a partition plan is that we do not wish to prejudge the U.N. vote & recommendation. After all, we have put the matter to the United Nations and cannot ignore the possibility of their finding an acceptable solution.

At the same time we must at all costs avoid being saddled with responsibility for implementing a plan not agreed by Jews and Arabs. Mr Martin's statement

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Statement in Sub-Committee one has destroyed the delicate balance we were maintaining and it may therefore be necessary to reaffirm in stronger terms our determination not to implement any but an agreed plan; which is however open to the objection stated in the first para. of this minute.

UN (Pol.) Dept. JA 15/xi

J. G. S. Beith
Nov. 5

R. Garran
5/xi

Tel. has been sent.

JAB
6.xi

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En Clair **GENERAL DISTRIBUTION**

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel
No. 6163 D. 1.26 a.m. 4th November 1947.

3rd November 1947. R. 7.04 a.m. 4th November 1947.

E 10304
4 NOV

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York
Jerusalem

United Nations. Palestine.

Early comment from the United States press and wireless on Mr. Herschel Johnson's statement of the 31st October on Palestine has not as yet revealed a very clear picture of United States opinion. Wireless comment has in general confined itself to an account of the proposals and to the conclusion that they are unlikely to be acceptable to His Majesty's Government. Press comment has gone somewhat further. But while some newspapers have welcomed the United States statement as presenting at long last a constructive proposal, others treat it with considerable reserve.

2. In the first category is an editorial by the New York Herald Tribune which shares a tendency noticeable in both camps to insist that Britain has a considerable degree of responsibility until the mandate terminates. This newspaper considers that the new proposals have the practical advantages of shortening the transitional period and eliminating the troublesome question of recruiting an international police force. It is apparently intended, the editorial continues, that Britain should play the major role in enforcing partition as this would take place before her troops could be withdrawn. Although this involves forcing Britain's hand and although there may possibly be civil strife, Britain freely accepted the mandate and the dangers now apprehended are due in no small part to her policy over the last thirty years. Her troops have been carrying out a negative and repressive policy - they are now being asked to carry out a constructive policy. While the United States offered only criticism, the editorial concludes, the British had reason to complain - now that the United States has made a constructive proposal a non-co-operative attitude on Britain's part would be hard to defend.

3. The views of the second category are represented by P.M. and the New York Times and can best be summed up in the words of an editorial in the former. This says that the United States plan for implementing the partition of Palestine which is in effect a plan to let Britain do the

implementing is beguilingly simple and direct in that it takes advantage of British experience, minimises the role to be played by a divided United Nations, and obviates the difficult problem of creating an international or United Nations force to fill the vacuum left by the retiring British. P.M. considers that if the British Government turns these proposals down the partition plan is left without any prop. If on the other hand the confidence of the United States Delegation in the proposals implies some understanding with the British Government the difficulty remains that the two States in Palestine will be left to face one another alone after July 1st next. P.M. therefore argues that while the United States plan should not be repudiated, it would be desirable that the Three-man United Nations Commission should carry the authority of the Security Council and should have the power to act as well as to advise, and that an international force should be created, the existence of which would discourage violence after July 1st. These two suggestions, it recommends, should be considered as the alternative plan at which the United States Delegation has hinted in the event of a British refusal to accept their present one. This newspaper also considers that the British position on implementation should be made clear before the vote on partition is taken, failing which partition would not obtain a two-thirds majority in the Assembly.

4. An article in the New York Times asserts, as does that in New York Herald Tribune, that some British forces are likely to be in Palestine until July 1st and that the mandatory power has certain responsibilities until the mandate is terminated. But it recognises that the decision is a difficult one for Britain and makes the same point as P.M. about the dangers of leaving the two States in Palestine to face one another alone after July 1st. It goes on to suggest that His Majesty's Government will not wish to see a war in the Middle East as a result of their withdrawal and suggests that they might be willing to keep the policing job under the aegis of the proposed United Nations Commission. The article concludes that the United States statement has not solved the Palestine problem since it has not been accepted by the Arabs. Any solution opposed by the Arabs leaves open the question of whether they will use force to fight partition and that automatically poses the further question of what will be done about it should they do so.

rrrrrr

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 10305 65

4 NOV

Registry Number E10305/951/31.

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3187.

Received in Registry 3. Nov

4 "

Palestine Sub Committee One.

Refers New York tel 3168 (E10231/951/31)

transmits text of proposals made by Soviet delegate at mornings closed meeting of Sub Committee 1.

Last Paper.

10304

References.

(*Minutes.*)

Dealt with in a tel. to N.Y.

5.XI

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8 Matheson. E.O.

1 M. 1.5 a.

M.O. 4.

Admty

O.M.

Nov 7

(on E10343)

(Action completed.)

7/11

(Index.)

1/8/48

Next Paper.

E10307

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

E66

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3187 D. 10.32 p.m. 3rd November, 1947

3rd November, 1947 R. 4.20 a.m. 4th November, 1947

Repeated Jerusalem,
Washington Saving,

E 10305
4 NOV

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

My telegram No. 3168.

Following is text of proposals made by the Soviet delegate at this morning's closed meeting of Palestine sub-committee 1.

[Begins]

1. The British mandate to be abrogated as from 1st January 1948.

2. The British troops to be withdrawn from Palestine within the shortest time possible, but not later than within three to four months after the abrogation of the mandate.

3. Since the termination of the mandate and up to the proclamation of the independence of the Jewish and Arab States a transitional period to be established in Palestine which should be as short as possible - not longer than a year since the abrogation of the mandate.

4. The administration of Palestine during the transitional period after the abrogation of the mandate to be assumed by the United Nations in the person of the Security Council which shall exercise the administration of Palestine through a Special Commission composed of the representatives of the Member-States of the Security Council, the seat of this commission being in Palestine.

5. On its arrival in Palestine the Special Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Jewish and Arab States in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly on the division of Palestine.

6. The Special Commission after consultation with the democratic parties and social organisations of the Jewish and Arab States shall elect in either State a Provisional Council of Government. The activities both of the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Special Commission.

7. The Provisional Council of Government of either

State not later than within 6 months after its formation shall hold elections to the Constituent Assembly on democratic lines. The election regulations in either State to be elaborated by the Provisional Council of Government and to be approved by the Special Commission of the Security Council.

8. The Constituent Assembly of either State shall work out a democratic constitution of its State and elect a Government.

9. The Provisional Council of Government of both the Jewish and Arab States after its formation shall proceed under the supervision of the Special Commission to the establishment of administrative organs of Government, central and local.

10. The Provisional Councils of Government of the two States shall within the shortest time possible form an armed militia from among the citizens of their States, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes. This armed militia in either State shall in its operative respect be under command of its national commanding personnel, but general military and political control over its activities shall be exercised by the Special Commission. [Ends].

Foreign Office please repeat Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 147.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office].

u u u u u

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Reference: FO 371/61886
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2

1947

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E 10307 68
4 NOV

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E10307/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del
New York

No. 3190

Dated 3 Nov

Received in Registry } 4 Nov

Palestine Sub Committee One.

Refers New York tel 3173 (E10256/951/31) Lebanese suggested that future meetings should be in public. Gives text of statement by Lebanese delegate and remarks on same by U.S. representative and list of questions by Canadian delegate, and Shertok of Jewish Agency.

(*Minutes.*)

JB Nov. 8

Last Paper.

10305

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8, Mathieson. C.O.
M.I.3a
M.O.4
Admty
O/M.
Nov 7
(on E 10343)

(Action completed.)

8/11

(Index.)

31/8/48

Next Paper.

E 10311

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

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Reference FO 371/61886
1 2 3 4 5 6

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP. WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3190. D. 3.05 a.m. 4th November 1947.

3rd November 1947. R. 10.00 a.m. 4th November 1947.

Repeated to: Palestine (Immediate)
and Saving to
Washington.

E 10307
4 NOV

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

My telegram No. 3173. [illegible]

At the start of this morning's closed meeting of Palestine Sub-Committee one chairman suggested that future meetings of Sub-Committee should be in public.

No objection was raised except by Jewish Agency whose representative asked that discussion on boundaries should be closed.

2. Chairman then announced that Soviet Union had a statement to make. Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) began by criticising American proposal that British mandate should be extended until independence had been achieved by the two States; as admitted by British Government the mandate had failed, it had given rise to present position and, even should Great Britain offer herself for work of preparing the two peoples of Palestine for independence, it would be wrong that she should be entrusted with the work. There were reasons to fear that if United States approach was accepted the important task which the United Nations had undertaken would be undermined. This conclusion was supported by the attitude of the United Kingdom as declared in statements of Mr. Creech Jones of 26th September and 16th October.

In view of the known fact that the Arabs would not accept the setting up of two independent States these statements, he said, left no room for doubt that United Kingdom would not take upon itself task of implementation. This meant that if American proposal for implementation were adopted by Assembly a recommendation for partition would remain a paper one and would never be implemented. Tsarapkin further criticised American proposal on grounds that proposed High Commission would have advisory functions only. Such a Commission "would be powerless and useless and would serve only as a cover by which United Kingdom could exercise its policy under the flag of the United Nations". Soviet Union could not agree that American proposal, or indeed any by which a single nation would be made responsible for the United Nations' task in Palestine, could serve as a basis for consideration of the problem. Soviet delegate then read out Soviet proposals of which text is given in full in my telegram No.5187. 100305/4

3. After some discussion as to further procedure United States representative said that he would like to make some preliminary remarks on Soviet proposals. It seemed to him that, in condemning United States proposal as one which would prejudice whole plan for establishment of independent States, Soviet delegate had not substituted a better one. The two proposals differed only in minor details. Same difficulty had to be met in both, that of Arab refusal to co-operate. This was the difficulty which the Assembly would have to meet in any plan which did not command the whole-hearted support of both parties. From this point of view, the sooner the parties controlled their own destinies and assumed their own responsibilities the better for all, and he failed to see what advantage there was in the Soviet proposal prolonging period of transition. As regards the position of United Kingdom, the United States knew full well the statements which had been made by Mr. Creech Jones; moreover, since the United States proposal had been made, these had been fully confirmed by statements attributed by the press to official spokesmen in London. But Soviet proposal assumed that United Kingdom can get out of Palestine in three months. Did the Soviet representative know that this was possible? United States proposal was designed to find a practical way whereby independent States could be set up in shortest possible time and without bloodshed. It was of course necessary to have a provisional date and in suggesting 1st July the United States had taken full account of statement of United Kingdom representative that Britain wished to get out. But in view of practical difficulties and also of Great Britain's moral obligations, United States did not believe that withdrawal could be effected in less than six months. Great Britain had all the experience necessary for the task of establishing independent States and it was ridiculous to suppose that any other body could achieve it in so short a time. "But we are not asking United Kingdom to effect partition; partition will be effected by decision of General Assembly". As regards the United Nations High Commission, it should not be assumed that the two States could always wish to accept the recommendations of this body; they would wish to have also advice and help of the authority which had administered Palestine for thirty years. "We have got to assume co-operation and goodwill and that there

will be a burying of animosities in this transition period. We can also assume that United Kingdom, which has so many interests in the Middle East, will likewise be motivated by enlightened self-interests and will do all she can to bring these two States into being in an orderly way".

4. Delegate of Canada said that he did not wish yet to comment on Soviet proposal but desired to put some preliminary questions:-

1) What was purpose of so long a transitional period as one year? Canadian Delegation preferred the shorter period of the American proposal.

2) Proposal was that British troops should leave country not later than 30th April. This was not a long time to get troops out. But was it not also a very short time for the setting up by Provisional Council of the armed militia which it was proposed should take place of British troops? There would undoubtedly have to be an interim period during which a United Nations force would be required. Could such a force be improvised so quickly?

3) Would proposed Special Commission have all the powers and procedure of its parent body, the Security Council? If so, bearing in mind the special powers of permanent members of Security Council, would this make for speedy action?

4) Could an explanation be given as to how the Special Commission would elect the provisional councils and how it would ensure that these councils would hold elections to the Constituent Assemblies on democratic lines?

5. Delegate for Guatemala urged the advantages of proposals previously put forward by his delegation. They provided for a flexible transition period. He opposed suggestion that matter should be put in hands of Security Council. Problem was one which should be taken out of realm of power politics and placed in hands of smaller States. A division from Mexico and a division from Sweden, for example, could be put into Palestine within one month.

6. Shertok on behalf of Jewish Agency put four questions:

1) Was it envisaged that all fundamental provisions of the U.N.S.C.O.P. report in respect of transition period would remain valid, in particular those regarding immigration and land transfer?

2) Would it be correct to understand Soviet proposal as meaning that organisation, equipment and

training of militia would start while British were still withdrawing? If so under whose control would they be formed? It would be necessary to ensure that there would be no interference by Britain in establishment of this militia.

3) Why such a long transitional period?

4) English translation stated that Special Commission would be composed of the member states of Security Council. Russian text could be read with or without definite article. Which was intended?

7. After some general remarks by the Chairman and United States representative to effect that there were many points in common between proposals of United States, Soviet and Guatemala it was agreed to continue discussion in afternoon in open session.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to High Commissioner Jerusalem as my telegram No. 148.

[Copy sent to Telegram Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem.]

W:W:W:W:W

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 10311 | 73
5 NOV

Registry Number	E10311/951/31
FROM	D. Busk.
No.	Embassy 392
Dated	Bagdad 25, Oct
Received in Registry	5 Nov

Palestine, Resolution by tribal Sheikhs.

Transmits translation of copy of resolution adopted by conference of tribal Sheikhs at Hilla on Oct 22 who call for general mobilisation of Arabs to assist in the defence of Palestine.

Last Paper.

10307

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Mathieson. C.O.
Nov. 11

(Minutes.)

Copy to C.O. (Mr. Mathieson)

This is another of Saleh Jabr's stunts.

Mr. Walker

J.E. Cable
(J.E. CABLE)
5/11

H. Beeley
Nov. 11

L.F.L. Pyman
14/11

BABB
14.11

(Action completed.)
LGM 17/11

(Index.)
29/8/48

Next Paper.

E 10323

32003 F.O.P

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGDAD.

No.392
(512/167/47).

25th October, 1947.

RESTRICTED.

10311
5 NOV

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit in translation a copy of the resolutions adopted by a conference of tribal sheikhs which took place at Hilla on October 22nd.

2. The resolutions were presented to me by the Secretary of the Conference Sheikh Mohan al Khairallah of the Humaid tribes in the Muntafiq. He was supported by Izzud Din al Mulla a Kurdish deputy from Erbil and two other tribal deputies, one Arab and one Kurd.

3. This conference was decided on at a meeting of tribal deputies in Bagdad on October 6th and all the evidence points to it having been a Government inspired move which lacked all spontaneity. The Prime Minister himself attended the conference and spoke in his capacity as a tribesman.

4. I have reliable reports that the conference aroused very little enthusiasm indeed among the assembled sheikhs, and that everything was stage managed by an official of the Government Propaganda Directorate. Another report says that a serious incident between Mohan al Khairallah and the son of his old enemy Badr er Rumayidh was narrowly averted.

5. At the interview during which I was handed a copy of the resolutions, I took the opportunity to point out rather maliciously the transport and provisioning difficulties which would attend a movement of Iraqi tribes to the assistance of the Arabs of Palestine, emphasizing that the bad harvest in Transjordan might make the Transjordan tribes unwilling hosts. The delegation appeared almost relieved at the possibility of the difficulties proving so great as to prevent any action.

6. The tribal spokesmen, who were somewhat ill at ease, were at pains to point out their long standing friendship for Great Britain and showed anxiety to learn her ultimate intentions. I referred them to the Colonial Secretary's two statements. I said that further bloodshed in Palestine was to be deplored and, speaking personally, I advised them to examine the advantages of a settlement by agreement between the Arabs and the Jews of Palestine.

/ 7. The

The Right Honourable
Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

7. The delegation subsequently called on the United States and Russian Charge d'Affaires. Over the former they scored neatly when he also pointed out the practical difficulties of the operation; to this they replied that Iraqi tribesmen could travel light "unlike the American army which has to be accompanied by trucks full of tinned marmalade." The latter meeting can hardly have been cordial in view of the strong anti-Soviet sentiments expressed to me by the delegation.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Damascus, Beirut and Amman and to the High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant,

Douglas Busk

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COPY.

Resolutions of the Conference of the Tribal
Chiefs of Iraq held at Hilla on
Wednesday, 22nd October, 1947.

---oOo---

1. The Conference considers Palestine as the beating heart of the Arab countries, an integral part of the Arab existence, and the first Kiblah (place of prayer) of the Moslems, and that every danger threatening Palestine threatens every Arab and Moslem country.

2. The Conference considers that every attempt aiming at dismembering any part of Palestine, though it may be one span, to give it to the Zionists is calculated to be a direct danger to the Arab and Islamic countries, and that it is the duty of the Arabs and Moslems to defend their existence by all means which wards off this sudden danger.

3. The Conference considers every solution of the problem of Palestine not satisfactory to the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab countries, which is imposed on them by force, as a challenge to them and a danger to security and peace in the Middle East.

4. The Conference considers every State or nation upholding the scheme for the partition of Palestine or the creation of an existence for the Zionists therein as a direct enemy of the Arabs and Moslems which should be boycotted and its political and economic interests in Arab countries exterminated.

5. The Conference considers that Palestine is threatened by danger, and, with a view to expediting the participation of members of the Conference in repelling this danger from the Arab character of Palestine and the Holy Land, a comprehensive general mobilization should be carried out in execution of the religious and racial duty and the views expressed by the Moslem and Christian religious dignitaries to the effect that a Holy

Jihad is essential.

6. Members of the Conference will prepare all members of their tribes who are able to carry arms in readiness for the carrying out of this Holy Jihad for the rescue of Palestine side by side with the Iraqi Army and other Arab armies.

7. It was decided to communicate these resolutions to the Secretariat of the United Nations Organization, the International Security Council, the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, and to the British, American, Soviet and French Governments, and to transmit copies thereof to all Arab and Oriental Governments, the Rais of the Royal Diwan, the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Council of Ministers, all Ministries, and the Higher Arab Committee in Palestine.

True copy.

(Sgd.) Mohan Al Khairullah.

375

1947

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PALESTINE

78
E 10323
5 NOV

Registry Number E10323/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3191.

Received in Registry 4 Nov
5 Nov

Palestine Sub Committee One

at Public Session 3 Nov delegate of Venezuela suggested the formation of working group of the delegates of the U.S. the Soviet Union and Guatemala to attempt to reconcile the proposals each had put forward for implementation. Herschel Johnson and Granados agreed, but Tsarapkin said he thought it would be more useful to hear first the replies to the questions put to the mandatory.

Last Paper.

10311

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

To Matheson CO
M.I.3(c).
MO4
Admty
Air M.
Nov 7
(on E10343)

(*Minutes.*)

The first para. is of importance in relation to general policy. The rest is detailed debate about economic union.

J. S. Beith
Nov. 5

T. Garran
7/11

7.11

(Action completed.) 8/11

(Index.) 3/8/11

Next Paper.

E 10338

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

E79

En Clair WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3191
4th November, 1947 D.11.20 a.m. 4th November, 1947
R. 4.49 p.m. 4th November, 1947

Repeated to Washington Saving

10323
5 NOV

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

When Palestine Sub-Committee One met in public session yesterday afternoon the delegate of Venezuela suggested the formation of w orking group of the delegates of the United States, the Soviet Union and Guatemala to attempt to reconcile the proposals each had put forward for implementation. Herschel Johnson and Granados at once agreed, but Tsarapkin said that he thought it would be more useful to hear first the replies to the questions which had been put in the morning. As regards the question as to why the Soviet Union had suggested so long a transitional period as one year he wished to emphasise that his delegation desired as brief a transition period as possible and that one year was intended as an extreme time limit. He promised replies to the other questions at the next meeting of the sub-committee.

2. Discussion of the U.N.S.C.O.P. provisions for economic union was then resumed. The following were points of particular interest.

(a) The Jewish Agency had proposed an amendment which would ensure to each state, rights to control its own fiscal policy, central bank, banking system, credit policy, foreign exchange and import licensing. This related to (b) of the statement of the objectives of the Economic Union which Granados had previously proposed should read "A joint currency system providing for single foreign exchange rate". Since the Jewish Agency's amendment appeared to be contrary to this guiding principle it was reworded as follows: "In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two states and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against them. So far as is consistent with above, each state may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licences, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit". Further discussion on this revised draft was deferred.

(b)

(b) The United States had suggested the following addition to the statement of the objectives of the Economic Union. "Access on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities". The United Kingdom representative asked the United States to clarify the intention of this amendment. Was it intended, for example, to ensure that there should be freedom of purchase of rights of usage of water? Herschel Johnson replied that it was simply intended to ensure that all the inhabitants of Palestine would have the right to the use of water on equal terms, that there should be no discrimination in the charging of rates, etc. Lisicky suggested that the intention should be made clear by redrafting and after further discussion the United States representative asked the United Kingdom delegate to propose an alternative wording. Martin replied that it would be improper for the United Kingdom delegate, in his position as an observer, to express agreement or disagreement with the United States amendment and that he had simply asked for an explanation of the intention underlying it.

(c) The Jewish Agency had proposed an amendment to the clause providing for the division of customs residue between the two states in equal proportions. This amendment provided that "In no year shall any State receive an excess of net receipts over its net contribution, exceeding the amount that would have been derived by equal division of the average of these net revenues in the two fiscal years 1945-1946 and 1946-1947". Granados opposed this by an amendment of his own whereby the division would be reviewable by the Joint Economic Board at the end of the first year and every two years thereafter instead of after an initial period of three years. Discussion was inconclusive.

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333

876

81

E

1947

PALESTINE

E 10338

5 NOV

Registry Number E10338/951/31.

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3203

Received in Registry 4, Nov

5 –

Palestine Sub Committee 2nd.

Morning (3rd) meeting of Committee began with further discussion of Sections D. Economic union and transit of Chapter VI of UNSCOP report, gives list of more important points.

Last Paper.

10323

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Matheson C.O.

M.I.3a,

MO4

Admty

A.M.

Nov 7.

(on E 10343)

(Action completed.)

8/11

(Index)

3/8/48

Next Paper.

10339

(Minutes.)

See Summary

JB Nov. 6

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

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En Clair WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 5203 D. 9.44 p.m. 4th November 1947

4th November 1947
Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington (Saving)

10338

5 NOV

IMMEDIATE
GIANT

This morning (open) meeting of Palestine sub-Committee One began with further discussion of Section D (economic union and transit) of Chapter VI of UNSCOP Report. Following are more important points.

2. In sub-section 1 ("The Economic Union of Palestine") it was agreed that (b) should read: "A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate". The additional recommendation on this point suggested by Jewish Agency (see paragraph 8 of my telegram 3191) was also accepted, subject to substitution of "held against such currencies" for "held against them" at end of first paragraph.

3. After discussion of various suggested redrafts of the paragraph regarding division of surplus revenue, including a proposal (submitted by Granados) that the Board should allocate to each State "in a proportion to be decided each year" and should take into account "that no State shall receive a share higher than approximately four million pounds in excess of its net contribution to these revenues, but the amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of establishment of the Union", it was agreed to postpone a decision pending consideration of a further alternative suggestion which the United States Delegation promised to submit later.

4. Following new paragraph suggested by Jewish Agency was adopted - "The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine exports fair and equal access to world markets".

5. On a further paragraph suggested by Jewish Agency requiring all enterprises operated by Joint Economic Board to pay fair wages, United Kingdom delegate pointed out that difficulties might arise from existence of different rates of wages in Arab and Jewish communities respectively. Shertok replied to effect that there was and could be no discrimination in wages paid by Government now or by Joint Economic Board in future, at least as far as its direct employees were concerned. On his suggestion the paragraph was adopted in the form "All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis".

/ 6....

NOV 1947

6. Committee passed to consideration of the alternative proposals for implementation. Venezuelan delegate said that these were on more or less similar lines, main differences being that Commission proposed by Soviet delegate was larger and possessed administrative as well as advisory functions. Chairman asked if United Kingdom Delegation had any comments on Soviet proposals. United Kingdom delegate replied that he had no comments at this stage. It did not seem necessary to repeat once more the general position of his Government as he had done after the United States proposal and questions which he might have raised with a view to clarification of the Soviet suggestions had already been put forward by other delegates. In reply to enquiry by Chairman, Soviet delegate said he was not yet ready to reply to the various questions put to him.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 149.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

ccc

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E

E10339 84

5 NOV

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E10339/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del

No. New York.

Dated 3206

Received in Registry } 4. Nov

5 –

Palestine Sub Committee 2

Refers New York tel 3203 (E10338/951/31) At afternoon meeting Pearson (Canada) said his delegation had some observations to make on the question of implementation: these were the result of a study of the proposals which had been put forward by others and were not in the nature of a proposal from the Canadian Delⁿ; these would come later when answers to questions put re the Soviet plan had been received.

Last Paper.

10338.

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8, Matheson, C.O.

M.I.3a.

M.O.4

Admty

A.M.

Nov 7

(on E/10343)

(Action completed.)	(Index)
8/11	31/8/48

Next Paper.

E10342

(*Minutes.*)

See summary

JB Nov. 6

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

E 10339 E 85

5 NOV

En Clair WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3206 D. 10.23 p.m. 4th November, 1947

4th November, 1947. R. 4.03 a.m. 5th November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE
GIANT

My telegram No. 3205.

At this afternoon's open meeting of Palestine Sub-Committee One the representative of Canada (Pearson) said that his delegation had some observations to make on the question of implementation; these were the result of a study of the proposals which had been put forward by other delegations and were not themselves in the nature of proposals: the Canadian delegation intended to put forward proposals at a later stage when answers had been received to the questions which had been put yesterday in regard to the Soviet plan. Pearson then proceeded to the reading of a prepared statement in which he criticised the suggestions of Guatemala and the United States that the General Assembly should itself take responsibility for the administration of Palestine on the grounds that the powers of the General Assembly are, explicitly, powers of recommendation and not of enforcement. He pointed out that the United States proposal depended on the cooperation of the parties concerned and that "failure of the mandatory or of the Jewish or the Arab people to cooperate, or the active resistance of any of these, would prevent the accomplishment of the objective". The termination of the mandate upon the withdrawal of the mandatory power would create a legal vacuum which would not be wholly or satisfactorily filled except by the emergence of the two projected States, an emergence which was dependent on cooperation. The Canadian delegation was inclined to agree with the United States view that there should be no further transitional period following the withdrawal of the mandatory; but the transitional period between the date of adoption of a plan by the Assembly and the date upon which the mandatory withdraws was a problem which he thought could not be dismissed so easily as had been done by the representative of the United States. As regards the possibility of trusteeship he pointed out that the terms of a trusteeship agreement have to be agreed upon by the "States directly concerned including the mandatory power" and that therefore

/while

NOV 1947

while juridically the trusteeship system could provide and appropriate means for implementing the majority report there might be practical difficulties in identifying the "States directly concerned". As regards the Soviet suggestion that the Security Council could competently carry into effect the recommendations of the majority report the Canadian delegation believed that under Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter, the General Assembly could recommend this course to the Security Council, and he thought it "distinctly arguable that Articles 24, 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter, in their combined effect authorise the Security Council to take the necessary action, either now or later if serious difficulties arise". There were however some practical difficulties which result from the use of the Security Council at this stage. The Security Council could not take effective action unless there were agreement among the permanent members that the present situation (as distinguished from any situation which might develop) constitutes an existing "threat to the peace". It would be necessary also that the permanent members agree as to the means of implementation. Before therefore making recommendations to the Security Council "we should make quite sure that there was general agreement among the permanent members, in principle, and to some extent also in detail, on these two points". Full text of Pearson's statement follows by air bag.

2. The delegate of Venezuela repeated a suggestion that he had put forward in the morning that the Canadian delegation should be invited to join the proposed working group to study the question of implementation. The Canadian delegate replied that his delegation had not put forward their comments with a view to participation in the working group, but that, if the Sub-Committee desired them to serve, they were willing to do so. The Soviet delegate said that he had no objection to the suggestion that all those who had put forward proposals in regard to implementation should meet together on condition that their discussion was not taken to constitute a formal exchange of opinions and that no formal decisions were reached; there must be no definite commitment. He would agree to an informal meeting but not to a formal working group. He had no objection to the participation of Canada. The Chairman accepted the Soviet condition and it was agreed that the delegates of the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and Guatemala should meet informally forthwith and that the Sub-Committee should adjourn until these delegates were able to report back the results of their meeting

3. The United States delegate proposed that discussions on boundaries should proceed in a working group simultaneously with the meeting of the four delegates discussing implementation. The Chairman explained that he and Fabregat had already formed one working group on boundaries and announced that his report would be ready this evening. (My telegram No. 3166 refers). It was agreed on the proposal of the Soviet delegate that further discussion on boundaries should wait until delegates had been able to study the Chairman's report.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 150.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

0 0 0 0

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1947

E

PALESTINE

E 10342 88

5 NOV

Registry Number } E10342/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

Mr Dundas

No. Damascus.

Dated 489.

Received in Registry } 4 Nov

5 "

Syria - Palestine Frontier.

Refer Damascus tel 481 (E 10137/951/31) H/C Palestine has sent following: will you please say whether this approach has yet been made and if so to what effect.

No approach has been made pending reply to tel under ref, please instruct.

(Minutes.)

Dealt with JB Nov. 5

Syr. P. - Damascus tel 102 to JERUSALEM
Rptd FO. 495 7/11

Instructions were sent to Damascus yesterday JB Nov. 6

Last Paper.

10339

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Matheson CO
M.I.3a
MO4
Admty
A.M.
(on E 10343) Nov 7

(Action completed.) 6/11

(Index.) 31/1/48

Next Paper.

10343

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

E 89

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Dundas,
No.489
4th November, 1947.

D: 6.2 p.m. 4th November, 1947
R: 7.23 p.m. 4th November, 1947.

Repeated to Beirut.

E 10342
5 NOV

TOP SECRET.

My telegram No.481.

The High Commission for Palestine has now sent me the following telegram.

[Begins].

Will you please say whether this approach has yet been made and if so with what effect.

[Ends].

2. No approach has been made pending a reply to my telegram under reference. I should be grateful therefore for urgent telegraphed instructions.

AAAA

5 NOV 1947

90

E 10342/951/31.

6 NOV

Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM DAMASCUS TO JERUSALEM

Mr. Dundas
No. 102 D. 9.4 a.m. 6th November, 1947.
5th November, 1947. R. 9.33 a.m. 6th November, 1947.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 495

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

Your telegram No. 1512.

I have not yet recieved authority from the Foreign Office, although I have urgently asked for it, to make the official communication contained in your telegram No. 1480. But I have taken opportunities during the past week of placing your views forcefully before the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.

F F F

1947

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PALESTINE

E 10343
5 NOV

Registry Number } E10343/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

Mr Evans

No.

Beirut

Dated

Received in Registry } 70 ?(Saving)
28 Oct
5 -

Arab Defence of Palestine.

Translation of statement issued to Press by Lebanese P.M. and published in local Lebanese newspapers also in Egyptian "Al Ahram" Oct 19. re Arab defence of Palestine.

Last Paper.

10342

References.

(*Minutes.*)

(J.E. Cable)
5/11

JB Nov. 5

FO ADJ 10/11

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

Q, Watkinson CO.
M.I.3a.
MO4
Admy
P.M.
✓ Nov 7

(Action completed.)
11/11

(Index.)
31/8/48

Next Paper.

E10349

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

E 10343 | 92

5 NOV

En Clair GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans.
No. 70. R: 10.05 a.m.5th November,1947.
28th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Cairo (Embassy) No. 68 Saving,
Cairo (B.M.E.O.)No. 53 "
Bagdad No. 98 "
Jedda No.104 "
Damascus No.261 "
Jerusalem No. 70 "
Amman No.106 "

Palestine

Following is translation of statement issued to the Press by the Lebanese Prime Minister and published in the local Lebanese newspapers also in the Egyptian "Al Ahram" of October 19th.

[Begins]

Riad Bey Solh, Lebanese Prime Minister, made a statement in which he explained the decision taken by the Arab League as regards the defence of Palestine and said that the Arab countries naturally have no fear for the Arabs of Palestine as long as the British are still there because they (the British) are responsible for peace in Palestine. Therefore, the decision of the Arab League to rescue the Arabs of Palestine means that the Arab armies will occupy the positions held by the British at present, after their evacuation, in order to prevent the Jews from taking over power.

"This is why when some news agencies published the news that the British are still responsible for peace in Palestine we were not astonished, because we knew it even before the reminder was published."

The Prime Minister continued "We have not received any official Note on this subject nor on any other subject from the British Government; what has been published by some news agencies is groundless."

[Ends]

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NOV 1947

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 10349
6 NOV

Registry Number E10349/951/31

FROM F O Minute

No. w/ Cable.

Dated 15 Oct

Received in Registry 6 Nov

Arab League Meeting, Sofar.

Transmits summary of Arab League Meeting held at SOFAR on Oct 9.
List of three decisions taken.

Last Paper

10343

References

(*Print*)

(*How disposed of*)

(Action completed)

7/11

(Index)

1/9/48

Next Paper

10350

(*Minutes.*)

Further minute submitted separately.

6/11

33538

10349

8 NOV

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ARAB LEAGUE AND PALESTINE

In accordance with the decision taken by the Political Committee of the Arab League at their Sofar meeting, the Council of the Arab League met at Aley on October the 9th to discuss their attitude towards the Palestine problem. The Council took three decisions:

(1) The "Bludan" decisions were still valid and should be implemented if any solution affecting the right of Palestine to be an independent Arab State were applied.

E.9484 Flag 'A'

(2) In view of the impending British withdrawal and the presence of Zionist forces and terrorist organisations in Palestine, Arab Governments were recommended to take military precautions on the frontiers of Palestine and states limitrophe to Palestine were asked to facilitate the participation of non-limitrophe states.

(3) Arab Governments were recommended to begin giving material and moral help to the Arabs in Palestine immediately and asked to provide the money required which would be spent under the supervision of a special committee, whose members would be Iraq, ~~Transjordan~~ and possibly Syria.

E 9551 FLAG 'J'

E.9445 Flag 'B'

2. Individual comment by Arab Leaders on this Meeting reveals some divergence of opinion. The Lebanese Prime Minister was pleased with the results of the Meeting and appeared more confident of the ability of the Arabs to stand up to the Jews than he had previously been. He said that the general attitude of the Council had been favourable towards H.M.G.

E.9472 Flag 'C'

3. ~~He said that the general attitude of the Council had been favourable towards H.M.G.~~ The Iraqi Prime Minister said that he had endeavoured to persuade the other delegates that the statement of H.M.G.'s policy on Palestine by the Colonial Secretary represented a considerable advance and was the maximum which could be expected. On the other hand, Saleh Jabr's attitude towards the Jews was intransigent and he hoped that, as soon as the British withdrawal had taken place, Transjordan and Iraq troops would occupy the whole of Palestine. He was anxious to come to an understanding with H.M.G. about this and to open secret negotiations about the mechanism of British withdrawal. On his return to Iraq he intended to get in touch with an unidentified "British Personality" to whom he had already written on the subject. In this connection Saleh Jabr suggested that the 6,000 men of the Arab Legion at present in Palestine should remain in occupation of their strategic positions after British withdrawal. Saleh Jabr no longer appeared to attach the same importance to the proposals for an economic boycott of Great Britain and the United States, which he had pressed so strongly

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5 NOV 1947
SENT TO DEPT.
NOV 1947

at the meeting of the Political Committee.

E.9473 Flag 'D'

4. Sheik Yussef Yassin (Saudia Arabia), however, told Mr. Evans that Saleh Jabr had again urged the meeting to decide on the economic boycott and that he had been very critical of British policy. Yussif Yassin himself had been far less enthusiastic and had insisted that Saudia Arabia would only cancel U.S. and British concessions when this action had been taken by other Arab states. He reported the Council's reaction to the Colonial Secretary's statement as being one of sober satisfaction mingled with anxiety and he himself was clearly less intransigent than Saleh Jabr. He too was anxious for negotiations with H.M.G. and discussed the possibility of establishing an Arab Provisional Government. He was still uneasy about the attitude of the Iraqi Government and again enquired whether the Iraqis were acting on the basis of a secret understanding with H.M.G. He also asked whether H.M.G. would be prepared to supply the Arabs and, by implication, Saudia Arabia in particular, with arms.

E.9483 Flag 'E'

E 9482 FLAG 'F'

5. On the 10th October Azzam Pasha (Egypt) Saleh Jabr and Samir Pasha (Prime Minister of Transjordan) had a meeting with King Abdullah of Transjordan, in order to persuade him to invite all the Arab League Delegations to visit Amman on the 13th October. According to King Abdullah, his visitors informed him of the decisions of the Council and explained that the proposed meeting on the 13th October was intended to give the lie to rumours of internal disagreement in the Arab League. The King replied that he would be delighted to give this invitation and that it was no fault of his that the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers had avoided Transjordan in the past. He said he had emphasised the importance of keeping H.M. Representatives fully informed of all developments and explained to H.M. Minister that this advice was principally intended for Saleh Jabr. The King's attitude towards the Jews was much more moderate and reasonable than that of the other Arab Leaders. He said that he had told his visitors that it was folly to talk of ejecting the Jews from Palestine, because the Arabs were probably not capable of achieving this even if the civilised world would permit them to do so. According to him, the others agreed that the wisest course was to come to terms with the Jews as soon as possible after the British withdrawal and to restrict them to the smallest possible part of Palestine. He thought, however, that negotiations would be useless until the Jews were convinced that they could no longer rely on British protection. The King also maintained that he was the best person to conduct such negotiations. In this connection, however, it should be borne in mind that Saleh Jabr told Mr. Evans that he had no intention of revealing more of his projects than was essential to King Abdullah. It may well be, therefore, that the agreement reached between King Abdullah and his visitors was polite rather than sincere.

E.9472 Flag 'C'

6. It is not yet clear what military action

/is actually

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E9551 FLAG 'J'

is actually being taken to implement the decisions of the Council. Samir Pasha envisaged the despatch to Palestine, as soon as the last British soldier had left, of an Expeditionary Force consisting of an Iraqi Brigade supported by the Iraqi Airforce and of the Arab Legion. The tribes would be sent in first to act as irregulars. He did not expect the Egyptians, the Syrians or the Lebanese to do more than send a few troops to their respective frontiers owing to the difficult internal situation in each country. He had secured Syrian and Egyptian agreement to the cost of maintaining the Arab Legion being borne by the Arab League as a whole, should the British subsidy be cut off. Samir Pasha explained that the intention was to occupy the whole of Palestine and to establish a Hashemite kingdom comprising both Transjordan and Palestine, in which the Jews might be granted local automomy. Samir Pasha hoped that H.M.G.'s attitude towards this project would be one of benevolent neutrality at least and that they would supply further equipment for the Arab Legion.

E.9433 Flag 'G'

Reports have been received that anti-Hashemite parties are recruiting armed bands in Syria and the Lebanon with the object of intervening in Palestine as soon as our evacuation begins, in the name of the Arab Higher Committee (i.e. the Mufti, whose presence in the Lebanon would fit in with such a scheme). The Syrian Minister of Defence told H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus that approximately 5,000 Syrian troops were on manoeuvres in the Qunaitra area close to the Palestine border. No other movements of troops have yet been reported and Azzam Pasha's statement to the Press that Egypt was moving troops has been denied by the Egyptian Minister of Defence.

FLAG 'K'

E9515 FLAG 'H'

7. In conclusion, it is obvious that the attitude of the Arab League has changed considerably since their meeting at Sofar, probably as a result of Mr. Creech Jones's statement in New York. Then the discussion centred round the possibility of applying economic sanctions against the U.S.A. and Great Britain, whereas the interest has now shifted to military measures and the "Bludan" decisions have been allowed to remain in suspense. A further change in the Arab attitude may well take place, ~~since~~ when their leaders have had time to study the statements of the U.S. and Soviet Delegates to the United Nations.

E.9462 FLAG 'I'

8. H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus has warned the Syrian Govt. that any incursion into Palestine would be considered as action against the Govt of Palestine. This warning has received considerable publicity and no further action appears to be required at present.

FLAG 'K'

J E Cable
(J.E. CABLE)
15/10

J Garran
15/x

This/

97

This is a useful account of the Arab League meeting.

Sir O. Sargent has made a query on the attached copy of Beirut telegram No. 727. The Bludan decisions were those taken at an earlier meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League. The most important decision was one relating to the cancellation of British and American concessions by Arab States in the event of the implementation of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. It seems that this aspect of the Arab States' threats has now fallen into the background, owing largely to the reluctance of Ibn Saud to cancel the oil concessions on which the whole economy of Saudi Arabia now rests, and that the League have concentrated on the less controversial measures of military action instead.

B.A.B. Burrows

17th October, 1947.

Useful. I am asking ~~the~~ Dept. to consider a supplement ~~to this~~ Mr Cable's minute bringing the information up to date.

C.F.A. Warner
19/x

I should be glad if this memo could be brought up to date, with a view to my submitting it to the S/S.

OS Oct 22

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1947

E

PALESTINE

E 10350
6 NOV

Comments by Mr Herschel Johnson.

Registry Number	E10350/951/31
FROM	U.K. Del New York.
No.	
Dated	1 Nov
Received in Registry	6 "

Transmits Press Release 229 of Oct 31 issued by U.S. Mission to U.N. being an unofficial abstract of the questions and answers which followed Mr Herschel Johnson's opening statement at his press conference.

Last Paper

10349

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

Pages 4 & 5 are worth reading

J. S. Bain
Nov. 7

11/XI

In P.P. Press Release 297 U.S. Mission to U.N. Oct 31.

JB Nov. 13

(Action completed) 11/11

(Index) 1/9/48

Next Paper

10353

33538

UK 2-5M-11-46-W

E 99

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK 5, N. Y.

E 10350
6 NOV

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

With Mr. Beeley's compliments

1 Nov. 1947.

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

For Immediate Use

Press Release #299
October 31, 1948

The following is an unofficial abstract of the questions and answers which followed Ambassador Johnson's opening statement at his press conference. The transcript of the opening statement is contained in press release #297, issued separately.

Caution: Use of this abstract is subject to the same condition which applied to the press conference itself: - Ambassador Johnson's statements are not to be used in direct quotation.

* * * *

Q. Mr. Johnson, would you please discuss, sir, the question of whether the United Nations is the guarantor of the borders of these two states? Did you touch upon that in your speech?

A. No, not at all. The United Nations is not the guarantor of the borders of anybody. But, if the borders of a state which is recognized by the United Nations and is generally accepted by the community of nations as being within certain borders, if these are attacked, we have the same situation that would arise if the borders of any state are attacked.

Q. We have the inference then that the borders of Palestine are guaranteed by the United Nations as the borders of any state are guaranteed?

A. Yes, where the United Nations has to take action.

Q. During the period before July 1, would the states have an opportunity to acquire arms or any other tools that they might need later to insure their own safety?

A. I think that that would be something that would have to be worked out between the mandatory, who is still responsible until they come in, and the United Nations Commission, in harmony with the leaders of those states. We do not envisage the possibility of these states trying to build up large armies, distinct from local gendarmerie for the maintenance of public order, and I do not think that any impediment would be put in the way of their securing such arms as would be necessary for the arming of a reasonable force of men. If they were to ask for astronomical figures, I think some eyebrows will be raised.

But I don't think they have the money to buy any great quantities of arms. We have not considered the possibility of what their military forces may be in the future, but what the civil force for the preservation of law and order may be, that would be their own responsibility. I think you can presume that the demands on their finances will be very heavy. They will have grave economic problems; they will have problems of setting up new machinery of state, education, public health service, everything else. I do not think the temptation to overarm will be too strong.

Q. This thing of the mandate is to July 1, 1948?

A. If that plan is accepted and if the mandatory accepts it. It is all predicated, of course, upon getting the acquiesence of the mandatory to carry these things out. But the mandatory has already made it entirely clear that they are going to get out and they want to get out both their troops and their administration soon, but they have not set a date. So, we have submitted a plan based on the volume of their machinery, military establishments, and their other agencies there, synchronizing the date of ending the mandate with the time when it would be physically possible to get them out.

Q. This police force which would come into being automatically on July 1, as I understand it, would have to be organized as of now?

A. They would have to begin on paper organization and getting things ready. We thought that this commission might have attached to it a small number of real experts in the organization of public order and finance, transportation, railroads, everything to help them get going. Furthermore, the economic union is something which would have to be formed during this period with the help and guidance of the United Nations Commission and the experts attached to it.

Q. So that the day of a presumed Assembly decision in favor of partition would also be the day on which this paperwork should begin?

A. I do not see why there should be any particular practical difficulty. Suppose this paln should be agreed to, based upon people who are already there building up a proper police force and gendarmerie **which** would not become active until the responsibility becomes theirs. But they would be ready to take over. You must remember, too, that as a practical matter we can have all the dates we please, but the large number of troops that the mandatory already has in Palestine cannot be gotten out on the date. It is a careful proposal. But you have to fix a date when the responsibility begins. We feel and many others feel that the Assembly recommendation should have a definite date that can be looked forward to as the time when the two states must assume responsibility of their own.

Q. This is a point on constitutional procedure. Is it your understanding, sir, that these two states in the six-months interim period would be de jure states, constituted de jure, but only become de facto states on July 1st.

A. I don't quite understand.

Q. In order to acquire arms or to recruit a gendarmerie we must have some kind of constitutional authority.

A. That would be done under the authority of the General Assembly resolution and with the consent of the mandatory. That is obvious. It is a working arrangement but they only become sovereign, with the power to employ these powers that have been built up, on the effective date when they assume their sovereign independence.

Q. Mr. Johnson, I am not quite clear who would be responsible for the maintenance of law and order between the time the Assembly approves the plan and July 1, 1948.

A. In my mind, without any question, the mandatory. The mandatory would be responsible until it was no longer the mandatory.

Q. Mr. Johnson, what is the life of the assisting or supervisory body that is to be set up?

A. Nobody in the world could answer that question. But it is not to be permanent.

Q. That does not go out of existence on July 1, 1948?

A. No, there is no provision made about that, and presumably the commission would want to stay on a while to work on a United Nations trusteeship for Jerusalem, to help get the thing going to help get the economic thing going. That is something that vitally concerns everyone. It is not a permanent body. There is no idea it would be that. Presumably there would be some continuing functions it might have which would be useful to everybody and which would have to be continued by the United Nations authority or trusteeship, whichever it may be, which would be established in Jeruselem.

Q. Is it responsible to the Assembly?

A. Yes, to the Assembly.

Q. Mr. Johnson, the UNSCOP report did not envisage either of these states becoming independent until constitutions were established which provided protection for minorities and certain other guarantees. What happens to that under this plan?

A. All of those stipulations we would try to implement through this United Nations Commission, working with the paper governments to be set up. They could be submitted to get provisional approval before the scheme becomes effective and given an immediate ratification by the first meetings of their parliaments on July 1. I think the spade work could be done before any government were set up.

Q. Who would be the deciding authority? Suppose one of the states did not comply with the recommendations concerning constitutional guarantees?

A. Naturally the success of this plan would depend in part on acceptance and cooperation of both states, but if, for instance, the Arab State refuses to cooperate, that is no reason why the Jewish State should not have its independence. Then if the mandatory were out, the United Nations would certainly have the responsibility in the form of trusteeship for the other state until they could pull themselves together and fulfill the requirements for independence. Now, just exactly what form United Nations administration over the area might take, or who would be the agency for it, is something which would have to be determined at the time. And I believe that the United Nations Commission resident in Palestine during this period would have ample time to make a pretty accurate forecast of what would happen on July 1 and make the necessary recommendations. We do not think it is possible to lay down a pattern now of just what ought to be done in the event that this or that thing happens, but the main thing is to have a responsible body of men representing the United Nations out on the spot who would be able to tide over an immediate emergency, and we don't anticipate that there will be no difficulties.

Q. Mr. Johnson, to whom will the United Nations Commission report? The Assembly is not going to be in session at that time.

A. Supposedly to the Secretary-General for handling in the usual way. The Atomic Energy Commission is also a General Assembly commission which operates when the Assembly is not in session. The Assembly may prescribe to whom this body would make its reports. We have not made any suggestion about that. My own idea is that the reports be made to the Secretary-General and distributed to all the member governments so that each member of the United Nations would know what is going on. If action is necessary, there is only one place it can be brought -- to the Security Council, under the Charter.

Q. In the case of the Atomic Energy Commission, isn't it responsible to the Security Council?

A. That was by stipulation of the General Assembly. The General Assembly may stipulate to whom this body shall report. We have not made any concrete suggestion about to whom it may report and who would then distribute the reports to all the members of the United Nations.

Q. Since there will only be a small United Nations Commission in Palestine, I take in effect that your scheme means that the mandatory power would actually partition Palestine.

A. The partition would be affected by the recommendations of the Assembly. The mandatory being there, we hope it will collaborate with the United Nations Commission in carrying out all of the practical chores that have to be done for setting up these governments -- that is, the division of the state assets, etc. They will have to work out together all those things that will come under the competence of the joint economic union. You have the police end of it. Of course, that would necessarily be so because the mandatory is there until the states achieve their independence and responsibility and authority for law and order. Naturally this supposes that we will have the mandatory's collaboration. If the mandatory opposes this we will have to try something else.

Q. In view of Mr. Creech-Jones's speech -- he did not want the United Kingdom to play the major role in enforcement -- is there any hope that the United Kingdom will agree to any such plan?

A. I should hope so. If I may venture a personal remark -- if we are going to have a new regime in Palestine and the mandatory is going to get out, as they have said they are, certain physical aspects of transition cannot be avoided by the mandatory because they are there with about eighty thousand men. I am certain that the United Kingdom does not want to leave Palestine in chaos. They want a peaceful transition as well as anybody else. They have made no pronouncement themselves on implementation schemes, but if the United Nations Assembly should adopt a plan, I personally would be optimistic that the United Kingdom, as a good member of the United Nations, would collaborate with the greatest good will in carrying it out. That is an expression of hope.

Q. Mr. Johnson, how well was your plan received this morning?

A. I have no comment to make about that.

Q. How about your earlier suggestion for an international police force?

A. This plan would obviate the necessity for that, we hope. It is based on the premise that the mandatory is responsible for the maintenance of law and order until it ceases to be a mandatory, the responsibility automatically passing to the authorities of the two independent states when the mandatory gets out.

Q. Do you think it is possible for the British Government to carry out what you propose if their withdrawal operations should result in there being very few troops left in Palestine by next April or May?

A. At that time we hope people would have gotten to the point where they would really collaborate and the law and order problem would require only small forces. I have great confidence in the ability and experience of British administrators.

Q. There is no mention of immigration in this plan?

A. That is a subject we have not covered yet in our Committee work. It is to be part of the report but will have to be gone into in great detail.

Q. Would you be prepared to increase immigration freely during the six-months period?

A. I cannot answer that question. We have not come to that and there are very divergent views on it. I do not know what the views on that will be. You know what is in the UNSCOP report; we have not come to a discussion of that in the committee. I really cannot answer any questions about immigration now. I don't know the answers.

Q. I think the majority report, and minority report, too, state that force would be necessary to carry out any solution, particularly a solution involving partition. This seems to imply that there is no need for such force.

A. We can scarcely expect that there would not be sporadic, unauthorized attempts at violence, but we refuse to believe that the Arab States, who are sovereign members of the United Nations, are going to declare war on the area that is Palestine in the face of articles of the Charter which would come into operation. We believe that the Jewish State will be able to set up a gendarmerie or police body that can take care of their internal order, and I do not believe that there is going to be any official attack on the Jewish State in Palestine.

Q. I just wonder, Mr. Johnson, if you could tell us how the commission will be made up?

A. Our idea is that they should be nominated by the General Assembly, which might possibly appoint a committee to consider possible candidates. They should be men of the highest caliber in terms of experience and proven ability, and should not be chosen because of their being the citizens of any state or for a similar political reason. The ideal member would be a man with all the qualifications who came from a state that had no connection whatever, either trade or otherwise, with Palestine. That would be an ideal solution.

* * * * * * * * * *

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

E 10350 / 951 / 31
12 NOV 1947

Press Release #297
October 31, 1947

FOREIGN OFFICE
105

~~No. 6~~
Eastern Dept.

REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON TO CORRESPONDENTS.

MR. WILSON:

You all know Ambassador Johnson and General Hildring. I want to say before we start that the procedure here will be like that of a regular State Department conference -- attribution to Ambassador Johnson but not direct quotation.

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON:

Well, gentlemen, the statement I made on behalf of our delegation this morning is in the nature of a suggestion because of the nature of the subcommittee. It is not in any sense a final decision either by the United States or by the subcommittee and certainly not of the Ad Hoc Committee, which will have to make the final recommendation to the Assembly. It is merely a plan which we believe would offer a reasonable hope of success in implementing the partition recommendation of the majority of the Investigating Commission.

There are certain fundamental facts which are premises which we might remind ourselves of. It is perfectly clear from the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, that is the subject of all this discussion, and from statements that have been made by the representatives of various countries in the Ad Hoc Committee, in the open debate, that there is pretty general agreement all around with respect to an early termination of the mandate. It is also clear from statements made by a representative of Great Britian that the British Government regards the early termination of the mandate and withdrawal of its forces and administration as desirable. In fact, they have said they are going to get out.

Now, the majority report of the Special Committee on Palestine, as you will all remember, recommends a two-year transitional period before final independence of the two states becomes effective, and the date they gave for the beginning of that period is already past now -- September, 1947 -- but they do recommend a two-year transitional period.

We feel, however, and I have suggested it to this subcommittee, that it would be possible to shorten very materially the time between the effective date of the recommendations that the General Assembly may make and the real independence of the two states. Our delegation thinks that complete and early independence is not only feasible but for many reasons desirable. Furthermore, we believe that the date for independence can be fixed on a practical basis and geared in with the plans of the mandatory power for withdrawing its administration and the troops that are now there maintaining public order. It can be arranged so that the mandatory power can simultaneously with withdrawing its administration and troops turn over all governmental responsibility, including that for the maintenance of law and order, to the authorities for the new Jewish and Arab States.

This procedure would make it unnecessary for the General Assembly to provide in its recommendations for a transitional period under a trusteeship or any other arrangement, and it would make unnecessary the establishment of a special United Nations force for maintaining law and order during the interim period.

Of course, it is absolutely essential for a decision to be reached in the subcommittee on this point, because if the idea of having the mandatory turn over its sovereign powers and its administration responsibility to two independent states (is accepted by the subcommittee) the various provisions in the (UNSCOP) report which provide for transitional period machinery would have to be deleted or modified.

Now, we have also suggested that the General Assembly appoint a small and very competent commission with a High Commissioner at the head of it we suggested that it might be composed of three top people -- to go out to Palestine as soon as possible after the effective date of the Assembly's action, to act in an advisory and guiding capacity with the leaders of the groups who will become independent states, or with the independent states, on this hypothetical date of July 1st (1948). Also, to work in collaboration with the British authorities still in Palestine and who, until the termination of the Mandate, are still responsible for its government and for the maintenance of law and order. We believe that a small commission composed of men chosen for their personal qualifications, demonstrated by experience and public record, can give the most effective assistance to the leaders of the Arab and Jewish groups who are going to have to form governments in those states. It also can act as a sort of catalytic agent without the mandatory. We believe, too, that if this plan were adopted the British government, as a good member of the United Nations, would help in every practical way possible. It would certainly be in their interest to do so and to have a peaceful transition.

The date of July 1, 1948 was thrown out as a suggestion. That is the earliest date suggested in any of the plans, I believe. One of the resolutions put into the Ad Hoc Committee mentioned September, 1949. I forget which country put that in, but our suggested date, in the absence of any knowledge on our part of the precise date when the mandatory will withdraw, would seem to fit in with practical possibilities when we know that there are many thousands of British troops and a heavy governmental machinery there that cannot be removed in a day.

We think, too, that this Commission which would go out there should be sent out as the representative and agent of the General Assembly. It naturally could not have any greater powers than the General Assembly itself has. Its powers would be that of recommendation. However, the self-interest, as we see it, of all the parties concerned would, it seems to us, have an impelling effect on the possibility of usefulness of this commission. If a definite date for independence is set, and both the Jewish and the Arab leaders and their peoples know that on that date they are going to become responsible for order in their own house, we think that it would be a very strong motivation for their getting to work and for seeking wise and experienced and unbiased advice, which is offered to them with the greatest possible good will by the United Nations. We feel also that, knowing that the mandatory is leaving, they will be wise enough to profit from the counsel and suggestions of the heads of the mandatory states.

Now, in regard to the questions of public order, which is one of the first questions raised by anybody in consideration of this plan, I would like to make it perfectly clear that according to our thinking with respect to our plan the two states themselves will be absolutely sovereign on the effective date of their independence and they themselves will be responsible for the maintenance of their own public order. Naturally, the most impelling motive they will have will be their own self-interest. During this period the United Nations Commission also would have the responsibility for formulating a recommendation for the setting up of a United Nations trusteeship, or whatever other plan might be finally adopted, for the government of the city of Jerusalem and the contiguous territory within such limits as might be finally recommended. We do not know yet what will be the precise territorial limits of any of these three states, that is, the Arab, the Jewish, and the free territory of Jerusalem.

Now, I have no doubt that every one of you can think of possible difficulties that may arise, as all the rest of us have thought of, and if I can help in any way by giving you some idea of the way our delegation has speculated on these difficulties and in what way they might be met -- if I can, I will be glad to answer your questions.

MORE

One other thing I had in mind to say. The question also arises of what body this United Nations group would be responsible to, and I think that the very terms of our proposal give the answer. It is responsible to the General Assembly. If another situation should arise, however, where there will be a real threat to international peace and security, the jurisdiction of that particular situation might well pass to the Security Council. We do not feel, however, that it is possible at this stage for our delegation, least of all, or for the committee or for the General Assembly, to anticipate by any kind of present action every possible difficulty that may arise. The most we can do is to lay down a plan which we hope is fair, and we want to be fair to everybody concerned, even if it does not give everybody everything they ask for. With a certain amount of good will and with some wise counsel on the part of competent people, the difficult transition period will be bridged and the two states become viable, both politically and economically, in a very short time. We feel strongly that the placing on the shoulders of the Jewish and Arab leaders in their states the full responsibility for their own future will be in some ways the best guarantee of its success. That may be too hopeful a statement, but as long as someone else is responsible, the people who are most concerned are not likely to progress as rapidly in their thinking and actions as when they must bear the entire responsibility themselves for those actions.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Note: A transcript of the questions and answers which followed Ambassador Johnson's statement will be issued separately.

CAUTION: Use of this transcript is subject to the same conditions which applied to the conference itself: Ambassador Johnson's statements are not to be used in direct quotation.

782

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 10353
6 NOV

Registry Number } E10353/951/31

FROM Paul S. Falla.

No. U.K. Del.

Dated New York

Received in Registry } 54/16/47. 29 Oct. 6 Nov

Palestine: Russian support for Partition.

Copy of letter from R. Sinclair giving information re motives behind the Russian support of the Plan for Partition. Once an independent Zionist state is established they will immediately seek to capitalise on it by putting forward similar claims on behalf of (a) Armenians and (b) Kurds.

Last Paper

10350.

References

(Print)

(How disposed of).

8/ Trafford Smith
Nov. 12

9/ Angora. no. 299
Nov. 25

(Action completed)
G.E.M. 25/11

(Index)
19/4/48

Next Paper

10373

(Minutes.)

~~Northern Dept.~~ 15/xi

Southern Dept.

Copy to
(Mr. J. Smith)

J.E. Cable
(J.E. CABLE)
6/11

Quite a possible explanation

J.G.S. Beith
Nov. 6

R. Garran
11/xi

11.11

This explanation fits in with Mr. Roberts' suppositions. MacRae 15/xi

Interesting: could a copy go to Ankara?
E. Peck
17.11

Copy to Angora
J.B. Nov. 19

33538

5M-4-47-W

Inter E

EMPIRE STATE BLDG.
61ST FLOOR
NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

109

Nº 54/16/47

October 29, 1947

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL

With the compliments of the

United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations

Paul S. Falla.

E 10353
6 NOV

B.A.B.Burrows, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S. W. 1, ENGLAND.

16

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Reference: FO 371/61886
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COPY

British Consulate-General,
25, Broadway,
New York 4, N.Y.

RS/ar.

16th. October 1947

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Paul,

I have been away in England for a couple of months, and have, therefore, been out of touch with current events over here.

Yesterday, however, I met and had a chat with a Moslem friend of mine who is on terms of personal friendship with a number of U.N. Delegates, Arabs and others.

We discussed the more recent developments in regard to the Palestine question, and he referred with bitter sarcasm to the fact that the United States had allowed itself to be manoeuvred into a position of alignment with the Soviet Union.

Apropos of the Russian support for Partition - and this is why I am writing you now - my friend told me in confidence that he recently attended a small private party at which certain Soviet delegates were present. From remarks made by them he formed a clear impression of the motives behind the Russian support of partition.

While the Soviets had declared themselves primarily in favour of a joint Arab-Jewish state, they had favoured this because they counted on profiting by the internal friction which would inevitably ensue.

They were now, however, strongly favouring the establishing of an independent Zionist state, because once this were a fait accompli they would immediately seek to capitalise on it by putting forward similar claims on behalf of (a) Armenians, and (b) the Kurds.

We know, of course, that Moscow has for some time past been playing up Armenian national aspirations, and one has seen in these a preliminary move towards advancing the old territorial claims against Turkey for the restitution of the lost homelands of Kars and Ardehan.

/Once

111

Once the United Nations had recognised and accorded their blessing to an autonomous Zionist state, they could, the Soviets calculate, hardly refuse to accord recognition to similar claims on behalf of the Armenians and the Kurds, both of whom, it would be argued, had stronger and much more definite claims to be national entities than the Zionists could ever pretend to have.

Furthermore, once the Armenian and Kurdish claims to national independence were recognised, Russia would lose no time in sponsoring the application of these, her two youngest satellites, for seats in the United Nations Assembly.

When one considers the geographical position of Turkish Armenia and Kurdistan in relation to the British and American controlled oil areas in the Middle East, the impelling motive behind the Russian action is not hard to find.

In view of the reliability of my source, perhaps you will consider passing this information on to Sir Alexander Cadogan.

Yours ever,

(Sgd.) Ronald Sinclair.

Paul S. Falla, Esq.,
U.K. Delegation to the United Nations,
Empire State Building,
34th. & 5th Ave., New York.

18

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 10373
6 NOV

/112

Registry Number E10373/951/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K.Del

No.

New York.

Dated

Received in Registry 3222.

5. Nov

6 –

Palestine, Sub Committee 2.

Refers New York tel 3164 (E10252/951/31) Sub Committee 2 is now revising the draft of its report, further meeting for the purpose of giving the report a final reading, is to be held on morning 7 Nov.

Last Paper.

10353

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

To Mathieson CO.
M.1.3a.
W.O.H.
a/ M.I
Admty
Nov 7
(with E 10343)

(Action completed.) 7/11

(Index.) 1/4/48

Next Paper.

E 10375

(Minutes.)

Sub-Committee 2 (Arab plan for a unitary state) is preparing a report, but it would seem from the telegram under reference - spare attached - that the report is merely that of the working group on legal problems. If that is the case (and I have seen nothing to suggest hitherto that the Sub-Committee has prepared a comprehensive report on plans for a unitary state), the Arab members of this Sub-Committee seem to be using their usual tactics of stalling for time, which is deplorable.

J. G. S. Beith

(J.G.S. Beith)
6th November, 1947.

Yes, the second sub-committee certainly seems to be accomplishing little.

R G Garran
8/xi

7.11

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

E 113

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3222 D. 8.27 p.m. 5th November, 1947.
5th November, 1947. R. 1.40 a.m. 6th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

E 10373
6 NOV

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

My telegram No. 3164. E

Palestine Committee.

Sub-committee 2 is now revising the draft of its report. Another meeting for the purpose of giving the report a final reading, is to be held on the morning of the 7th November.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 154.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

F F F

6 NOV 1947

784

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 10375
NOV 114

Registry Number } E10375/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del

No. 3217.

New York.

Dated 5, Nov

Received in Registry } 6 -

Palestine, Sub Committee One.

Refers New York tel 3206 (E10339/951/31)

Transmits text of suggestions submitted by Canadian delegate "on implementation of the Assembly plan for the future Govt of Palestine" to working group on implementation. They do not constitute formal proposals by the Canadian Govt.

(*Minutes.*)

See E10431 & minute

JB Nov. 8

Last Paper.

10373

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

8 Mathieson C.O.
M.I.3a.
MO4
Admty
Q.M.
Nov 7
(on E10343)

(Action completed.)

14/11

(Index.)

7/9/48

Next Paper.

10376

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

115

10375

E

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP   WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3217.   D. 5.35.p.m. November 5th,1947.
November 5th,1947.   R. 11.00.p.m. November 5th,1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington, Saving.

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

SECRET.

E 10339/

My telegram No. 3206.

Canadian delegate has submitted following "suggestions on implementation of the Assembly plan for the future Government of Palestine" to Working Group on implementation, explaining that they are to be regarded merely as points for discussion and do not constitute proposals put forward formally by the Canadian Government.

[Begins].

"There is general agreement that the transitional period should be as short as possible, and one delegation has proposed that it be abolished altogether. If it is possible to do away with the transitional period, I suggest that we consider the following procedure for implementation:-

(A) the General Assembly may, if a decision is taken in favour of partition, consider a report from the Ad Hoc Committee in which a settlement of the Palestine question is recommended along the lines of the majority report of the Special Committee;

(B) if the Assembly adopts a report of this character, the Assembly could state that it regards the situation in Palestine as constituting a threat to the peace as defined in Article 39 of the Charter, and that it considers that prompt action is made necessary by the announcement of the Mandatory Power

/that

NOV 1947

that it will withdraw from Palestine in the near future;

(C) the Assembly could further, in the light of this statement, request the Security Council by virtue of its authority under Articles 39 and 41, to take certain steps. The steps recommended would be:

First: to recognise, on the date of withdrawal of the Mandatory Power, the existence of the two States within the present boundaries of Palestine as recommended in the proposed resolution of the Assembly on Palestine;

Second: To request immediately (i.e. as soon as the Security Council is seized of the matter) that the Jewish Agency for Palestine should undertake measures for the establishment of a Government to assume authority immediately upon withdrawal of the Mandatory Power in the proposed Jewish State;

Third: To request immediately the Arab League in consultation with representatives of the Arab Higher Committee to undertake measures for the establishment of a Government which shall assume authority immediately upon the withdrawal of the Mandatory Power in the proposed Arab State;

Fourth: To make whatever arrangements are necessary to assist the Mandatory Power in the maintenance of order during the period prior to its withdrawal;

Fifth: To appoint a Preparatory Economic Commission to make whatever arrangements are possible for the introduction of measures of economic co-operation between the two States when the Mandatory Power withdraws with a view to establishing a Joint Economic Board as provided in the majority report;

Sixth: To make arrangements for the Government of the City of Jerusalem as provided in the proposed resolution of the Assembly on Palestine.

(D) I now return to the general recommendations which I think the Assembly might make, having placed responsibility in the hands of the Security Council as I have suggested above the Assembly might further recommend that the Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the

Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement brought into effect under the arrangements suggested above.

(E) Finally it might be recommended that the Security Council give effect to any adjustments in the plan to which the parties directly interested during the period before the surrender of the Mandate - that is, the Mandatory Power, the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab League - agree".

[Ends.]

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram 152.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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118

E 10376
6 NOV

PALESTINE

Registry Number E10376/957/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

No. U.K. Del

Dated New York.

Received in Registry 3221.
5 Nov
6 "

Palestine Sub. Committee I.

Refers New York tel 3135 (E10126/957/31) Jewish Agency have asked that Jewish areas of "New Jerusalem" together with Mount Scopus, should be an enclave - Jewish State.

Further comments.

Last Paper.

10375

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Matheson. C.O.
M.I.3c.
M.O.4
Admlty
A.M.
Nov 7
(on E10343)

PTO.

(Action completed.)
G E M 8/1

(Index.)

Next Paper.

E 10410

(Minutes.)

The present proposal by the Jewish Agency would effectively torpedo the provision in the Majority Plan for a "City of Jerusalem" under international trusteeship, which would include the surrounding villages and towns. The Jews are activated in this matter by the desire to include in the Jewish State the Jewish areas of "New Jerusalem", which are said to contain about 90,000 Jews i.e. more than 10 percent of the total Jewish population.

J. G. S. Beith

(J.G.S. Beith)
6th November, 1947.

P. Garran
6/11

7.11

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

1817

Tel, New York.
3977
18, Nov.

8, Washington. Co
Nov. 20

119

E 10376

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3221 D. 8.29 p.m. 5th November, 1947

5th November, 1947. R. 1.55 a.m. 6th November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE
GIANT
SECRET

Following for Lloyd, Colonial Office, from Martin.

10126/911

Jewish Agency have asked (see our telegram No. 3105) that Jewish areas of "New Jerusalem", together with Mount Scopus, should be an enclave in Jewish State. There are arguments for and against this but it would at least relieve the authority responsible for the administration of Jerusalem from jurisdiction over a large body of citizens whose first loyalty would be to an external Government.

2. In event of acceptance of Jewish proposal, Arab areas of "New Jerusalem" might

(a) remain with the old City under an international régime on lines of U.N.S.C.O.P. plan or

(b) be administered as a separate borough in the Arab State, leaving only Old City to international administration.

3. Old City seems too small an area to be placed under a distinct administration and it is in any event closely linked with the Arab area which contains railway station, hotels and other institutions serving its pilgrim and tourist traffic. Moreover, if Arab area of New Jerusalem were taken from "trusteeship" area they would presumably take with them the surrounding country, including Bethlehem, which would thus not fall under the direct protection of the international administration.

4. There would therefore seem to be much to be said for third alternative of assigning both Old City and Arab Areas of New Jerusalem to the Arab State. There would then be no "City of Jerusalem" on lines proposed by U.N.S.C.O.P. and we should avoid difficulties inseparable from the

/establishment

6 NOV 1947

establishment of an international régime in the existing state of international relations, which are only too obvious. Such an arrangement would improve economic viability of Arab State and provide it with its natural capital, thus going some way to meet Arab opposition to partition. Objections will come from

(1) Christian dislike of a proposal that would put the Holy Places under predominantly Moslem Government and

(2) Jews, with special reference to the Wailing Wall. Safeguard for religious shrines and holy places might, however, be provided by appointment of a United Nations Commissioner with special responsibility for watching over international interests in them (including those in other parts of Palestine for which, apart from Bethlehem, the U.N.S.C.O.P. plan provides the only safeguard of the proposed declarations). It is doubtful how far political Zionists would press their objection if their claim to the Jewish area of Jerusalem outside the Walls is met. As regards Christian sentiment, it would be pointed out that the Holy Places remained undisturbed for centuries under Moslem control.

5. In any event there would have to be special arrangements covering services common to all sections of Jerusalem

6. Should be grateful for your early observations and those of High Commissioner to whom this telegram is being repeated. Matter is urgent as U.N.S.C.O.P. proposal is likely to be discussed at an early date.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 153.

[Advance copy sent to Cypher Section, Colonial Office for Mr. Lloyd].

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

0000

14 November 1947.

My dear Beith,

Could you please put the attached draft in the machine for transmission to New York. I believe that Trafford agreed it with you a few days ago.

Yours ever,

W.A.C. Mathieson

P.S. I have repeated a duplicate to Jerusalem.

Registry No.

CYPHER

OUT FILE

122

Date 18/11

~~Despatched~~ 4.15 M

Draft.

SECRET

Sir A. Cadogan,
New York.

Tel. No. 3977
Nov. 18

Cypher

dept'l. No. 1

Copy C.O.
(Mr Mathieson)

Repeated by C.O. to Jerusalem

RECEIVED IN C.R.
19 NOV
SENT TO DEPT.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Your telegram No. 3221. Following for Martin from Lloyd, [Colonial Office.]

We fully endorse the views of the High Commissioner for Palestine in his telegram to you No. 1526. If we were to add to his arguments it would only be by reference to the findings of the Partition Commission (Chapter 9 of their Report) where a Jewish proposal is examined, very similar to that put forward in New York. We note from ~~New York~~ Your Telegram [to Foreign Office] No. 3283 that you have already made some factual comment on the difficulties inherent in the Jewish proposal. Should the United Kingdom representative be called upon to comment in the Main Committee on any proposal which may emerge from the study referred to in paragraph 7 of that telegram the views expressed by the

/High

2.15 pm

High Commissioner should be of the greatest assistance. Our feeling is that some international regime for Jerusalem must emerge from the present Assembly discussions which will also ~~and that the area to be~~ indicate the area to be included ~~under such a regime must be not~~ included under the regime ~~less than that proposed by UNSCOP~~.

~~2. With reference to paragraph 5 of New York Telegram to Foreign Office No. 3051 regarding the preparation of a draft statute for the City of Jerusalem, I am afraid that little progress has been made. We have assembled a certain amount of material for this work and we hope that Gibson may find time during his present visit to help us with the draft. Our many other preoccupations, however, make it unlikely that there will be rapid progress on this work.~~

~~SECER.~~

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

2 With reference to paragraph 5 of Your ~~New York~~ telegram [to Foreign Office] No. 3051 regarding the preparation of a draft statute for the City of Jerusalem, I am afraid that little progress has been made. As you know, the idea that we should sponsor some form of separate régime for Jerusalem is not acceptable to Ministers here. This being so, in the present situation there seems little point in going on with the preparation of the draft simply for possible use as background by the UK Delegation.

3. This telegram is being repeated to Jerusalem

JB. Nov. 18

125
END

OUT FILE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3977

D. 4.15 p.m. 18th November, 1947

18th November, 1947

SECRET

Your telegram No. 3221. Following for Martin from Lloyd, [Colonial Office].

We fully endorse the views of the High Commissioner for Palestine in his telegram to you No. 1526. If we were to add to his arguments it would only be by reference to the findings of the Partition Commission (Chapter 9 of their Report) where a Jewish proposal is examined, very similar to that put forward in New York. We note from your telegram to Foreign Office No. 3283 that you have already made some factual comment on the difficulties inherent in the Jewish proposal. Should the United Kingdom representative be called upon to comment in the Main Committee on any proposal which may emerge from the study referred to in paragraph 7 of that telegram the views expressed by the High Commissioner should be of the greatest assistance. Our feeling is that some international regime for Jerusalem must emerge from the present Assembly discussions which will also indicate the area to be included under the régime.

2. With reference to paragraph 5 of your telegram to Foreign Office No. 3051 regarding the preparation of a draft statute for the City of Jerusalem, I am afraid that little progress has been made. As you know, the idea that we should sponsor some form of separate regime for Jerusalem is not acceptable to Ministers here. This being so, in the present situation there seems little point in going on with the preparation of the draft simply for possible use as background by the United Kingdom Delegation.

3. This telegram is being repeated to Jerusalem.

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